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This thesis analyses traditional and contemporary democratic theory from an 
epistemic, instrumental angle. It argues that these theories depend too heavily on 
intrinsic values, such as equality of participation, which then sacrifice good decision 
outcomes. Using a reverse-contractarian tool, where social contracts can be 
prospective rather than retrospective, it is possible to argue that a free public would 
form government on the basis of services it provides and ergo, instrumental reasons. 
As such, legitimate decisions are those that are based upon an evidential diagnosis of a 
problem, and use evidence to help bring about the good provision of such problem-
solving services. It uses the observation of topic-specific ignorant majorities, defined 
as being where each citizen has both areas of expertise and areas of ignorance, to 
criticise both fair-proceduralist accounts and non-democratic technocratic accounts. 
The former overstates the contribution that every citizen can have when designing and 
managing those services, whereas the latter understates the broader contribution 
knowledgeable minorities can have in governance. Overall, a tailored democracy is 
called for using the name service democracy, which is a theoretical response to the 
above observations. 
It concludes by offering epistemic policy proposals that could be implemented within 
the current governmental institutions and policy processes. It calls for state-funding of 
political parties to avoid undue influence over policy, committee oversight of 
ministerial appointments so that competence can be assessed and finally academic and 
professional crowd-sourcing to allow the wider knowledgeable minority in a given 
area to contribute to policy creation and development. 
  
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction «««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 1 
5HVHDUFK4XHVWLRQ«««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
&RQWH[WRI5HVHDUFK«««««««««««««««««««««««««... 4 
Structure and Methodology«««««««««««««««««««««« 
Chapter One: Democratic Theory««««««««««««««««««« 
1.1 Classical Democracy««««««««««««««««««««««« 
1.3ROLWLFDO$LPVDQG,GHDOV«««««««««««««««««««««11 
1.1.2 Citizenship and Institutions«««««««««««««««««««««13 
1.1.3 Summary«««««««««««««««««««««««««««««14 
 
1.2 Republican Democracy«««««««««««««««««««««« 
1.2.1 Italian City Republics««««««««««««««««««««««« 15 
1.2.2 The Roman Republic««««««««««««««««««««««« 16 
1.2.3 Developmental and Protective Republicanism«««««««««««« 16 
1.1.4 Summary«««««««««««««««««««««««««««««20 
1.3 Modern Democracy ««««««««««««««««««««««« 
1.3.1 Liberal Democracy««««««««««««««««««««««««21 
'HOLEHUDWLYH'HPRFUDF\««««««««««««««««««««««. 26 
6XPPDU\««««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 27 
1.4 The Origin of Instrumental Values ± Social Contract Theory««««««« 
Conclusion«««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
Chapter Two: Deliberative Democracy«««««««««««««««« 
2.1 2YHUYLHZRI7KHRU\«««««««««««««««««««««««... 36 
2.1.1 Habermas and Rawls«««.««««««...«««««««««««««37 
2.1.2 Recent Views««««««««««.««««««««««««««««44 
2.2 Analysis and Criticism«««««««««««««««««««««« 
Conclusion«««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
Chapter Three: Ignorant Majorities..««««««««««««««««« 55 
3.1 3ODWR««««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
  
3.2 -RKQ6WXDUW0LOO«««««««««««««««««««««««««. 59 
3.3 Competitive ElitLVP««««««««««««««««««««««« 
3.4 Ignorant Majorities and Knowledge Bases««««««««««««««« 
3.4.,JQRUDQW0DMRULWLHV««««««««««...«««««««««««.««. 68 
3.4.2 The Threshold of Knowledge in a Polity..««««««««««««.««72 
Conclusion««««««««««««««««...««««««.««««« 
Chapter Four: The Service Democracy and the Better Decision...«.«««« 
4.1 Epistemic Proceduralism««««««««««««««««««««« 
 
4.2 Instrumental Values and the Better Decision«««««....«««««««« 
 
4.3 The Service Democracy««««««««««««.«««««««««« 
Conclusion«««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
Chapter Five: Application to Real-World Politics««««««««««««.. 90 
5.1 The Public Policy Process««««««««««««««««««««« 
5.1.1 Theoretical Accounts of Policy Making«««««««««««««««91 
7KH&ULPLQDO-XVWLFH3ROLF\3URFHVV««««««««««««««««. 95 
5.2 Epistemic Policy Proposals«««««««««««««««««««« 
5.2.1 State Funding of Political Parties«««««««««««««««««102 
5.2.2 Committee Oversight of Ministerial Appointments««««««««««105 
5.2.3 Academic and Professional Crowd-Sourcing««««««««««««107 
Conclusion««««««««««««««««««««««««««««109 
&RQFOXVLRQ«««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 
Review of the ArgXPHQW««««««««««««««««««««««« 
,PSOLFDWLRQV««««««««««««««««««««««««««« 










µDemocracy cannot succeed unless those who express their choice are 
prepared to do so wisely. The real safeguard of democracy therefore is 
HGXFDWLRQ¶ ± Franklin D Roosevelt. (Peters & Woolley, 1938)  
As this quote suggests, knowledge plays a vital role in the making of decisions 
in both political and non-political contexts. Without it, decisions become, at best, 
guesses upon what an individual believes may be the case and this can then lead to 
very poor outcomes. The President is therefore mindful of popular ignorance and how 
the decision-making procedure of democracy has the potential to become a negative as 
much as a positive. The tool to combat this is the acquisition and application of 
knowledge.  
The debates within democratic theory can be split into three main rivalries. 
The first of these is direct democracy vs representative democracy, where debates 
consider the remoteness of citizens to decision making and so can be termed the 
µUHPRWHQHVVGHEDWH¶. The second debate centres on deliberative democracy vs 
pluralism, or rational consensus vs plurality of interestsDQGFDQEHWHUPHGWKHµQDWXUH
GHEDWH¶DVLWFRQVLGHrs the nature of political interaction. The final debate looks at the 
legitimacy of democratic decision making and considers fair procedures vs epistemic 
procedures, making it WKHµOHJLWLPDF\GHEDWH¶. It is this latter debate that this thesis 
will contribute to in its attempt to outline how a focus on epistemic procedures and 
valuing good outcomes iVWKHPRVWSUHVVLQJDVVHVVPHQWRIGHPRFUDF\¶VXWLOLW\ 
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 In an age of mass media and instant access to information, it would be 
assumed that citizens are the most informed that they have ever been. However, it is 
more likely that citizens are not due to the quality of information that they encounter 
(Fiskin, 1991, p. 19). With an increasing array of competing news channels, apps, 
websites etc. WRVHOHFWIURPPHGLDRXWOHWVDSSHDUWREHRSWLQJWRµHQWHUWDLQ¶WKHLU
audience to keep them watching, rather than provide substantive analysis (Biser, 1993, 
p. 13). After all, news outlets are aiming to make a profit and so must attract viewers 
to maintain their advertising revenue. Whilst it is possible that people could do their 
own research and reach a balanced, reasoned conclusion, most people appear to not do 
this: possibly believing that the media is doing it for them. As such, we end up with an 
electorate who believe they understand current affairs, without actually possessing the 
correct facts. A survey from July 2013 conducted by Ipsos Mori for the Royal 
Statistics Society and Kings College London (Ipsos Mori, 2013) showed that on major 
public issues the electorate were way off in their belief in what was happening. For 
example, 58% of respondents thought that crime was going up, yet the Crime Survey 
for England and Wales (a survey that asks householders what their experience of 
crime had been like in the preceding year) showed, along with police recorded crime, 
that crime in 2012 was 19% lower than 2005/06 and 53% lower than 1995. With 
regards to social security and benefit fraud, respondents thought that 24% of the 
budget was claimed fraudulently, when the real estimate is 0.7%. Finally, respondents 
thought that 24% of the UK population were Muslims, yet the real figure from the 
2011 census is 4.9%. Another survey was conducted for 2014 by Ipsos Mori (Ipsos 
Mori, 2014) and it showed the same gaps between reality and public perception. For 
example the public thought 24% of the population were immigrants when the reality is 
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13%, and they thought that 16% of all 15-19 year old girls get pregnant in a year when 
in reality it is 3%. 
It is this popular ignorance that this thesis will consider, and indeed originally 
was a motivator for writing it, in light of democratic theory and ultimately propose an 
epistemic model of democracy, the service democracy, which attempts to apply the 
topic-specific ignorant majorities observation that I make, where the exercise of power 
should utilise the knowledge that people do have and focus on the objective use of 
evidence, experts and reason when making decisions over pubic life and the regulation 
of civic life. This does throw up concerns and tensions between democracy and 
expertise; between evidence and the public will. If representatives are required to 
OLVWHQWRWKHSXEOLF\HWWKHSXEOLF¶VXQGerstanding of facts is so incorrect, how can it 
be said that democracy is practicable in this form?  
This thesis will be primarily concerned with providing a normative foundation 
for a system where there is greater evidence-based policy, whilst maintaining an equal 
standing between all participants. As such, in the spirit of John Rawls in Political 
Liberalism (2005), this will not be a comprehensive moral conception that considers 
how best to live, but a political conception that considers the constitutional 
arrangements and institutional structure of society. After all, each individual citizen 
has topics that they know well and others topics not so well. Instead of ignoring such 
knowledge imbalances, the model will use the knowledge that is available and this 
will allow for popular engagement, but in a more tailored way. It does not suggest that 
a technocratic elite dominate society, but instead, all people are still allowed to engage 
with democracy but their decision-making functions should be limited to what they 
demonstrably know about. This is important because the decisions made affect not 
only the individual making them (as is the case within economic market places) but 
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also other people. The threshold for skill and knowledge is therefore higher when 
taking such wide-effecting decisions. I certainly want to know that representatives or 
voters have a level of competence when making decisions over my life and wellbeing. 
 In sum, the research question that will be answered can be reduced to: µ,V
popular ignorance an issue in democratic theory and, if so, can its limitations be 
RYHUFRPHE\WKHVHUYLFHGHPRFUDWLFPRGHO"¶ 
 
Context of the Research 
This research question is driven by a critique of academic democratic 
theoretical debates. From the perspective of theory, it will be engaging with both 
historical and modern discussions and will be considering the classical democratic 
model of Athens, the republican models of Rome, Italian city-states and France and 
finally will consider contemporary debates on liberal democracy and deliberative 
democracy. The latter will be focused upon more due to it being a contemporary 
theory.  However, all of the above will be shown to have concerns, especially in their 
insistence on popular involvement and the potential expense of good decision 
outcomes. Most require that citizens play an active role in the decision-making and 
functioning of the democratic state, yet fail to explain how a productive economic life 
(i.e. employment) can be easily coupled with an active public life. It will be argued 
that many people simply do not have the time or energy to fulfil both and so, typically, 
involvement in public life is sacrificed over reduced time in work or with family and 
friends.  
In such a culture, to accept, especially like deliberative democracy does, that 
knowledge is an important aspect of good decision-making means the model runs into 
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great difficulty when the realities of life are factored in. Indeed, any democratic model 
that accepts representative democracy acknowledges that representatives can be more 
productive because they have the time, through being paid, to deliberate and research 
many matters of state. Despite being a deliberative democrat, a great focus shall be 
JLYHQWR'DYLG(VWOXQG¶VZRUNLQDemocratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework 
(2008) as he gives a good account of how value should come from an epistemic 
decision-making procedure, rather than individually assessing each outcome.  In 
summary, democracy can suffer from the very elements that make it revolutionary i.e. 
that people, irrespective of their actual knowledge, are allowed to make decisions over 
RWKHUSHRSOH¶VOLYHVDVZHOODVWKHLURZQ$IWHUDOOWKLVLVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIFROOHFWLYH
decision-making and means that an individual is effectively subjected to the will, and 
judgement, of the remaining citizenry. 
To counter the above concerns of ignorance, the service democracy model will 
be considered which primarily focuses on the instrumental value of democracy and on 
ensuring that those who do possess more knowledge in a given area have the 
opportunity to exercise it. Those who do not possess knowledge on a given area, and 
so are not part of the specific knowledge base, are still important EXWLQDµFRQVXPHU-
OLNH¶UROH7KLVPHDQVWKDWIHHGEDFNXSRQWKHTXDOLW\ of a service is vital, but such 
individuals will not necessarily be given the power to decide how services are 
improved.  
 
Structure and Methodology 
 To do this the research will consider what democracy is in light of various 
democratic models and will focus in on the values of democracy. These values are 
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generally divided into two categories: intrinsic and instrumental. This follows the 
typical approach of value theory, where normative ethical theories can be assessed as 
to their values and importance (Driver, 2007, p. 8). Intrinsic value relates to aspects of 
democracy that are inherently valuable and exist by virtue of democracy existing, with 
political equality, positive freedom and self-realisation being examples. Instrumental 
relates to the outcomes of democracy and the things that can be achieved by having 
such collective decision-making and having a variety of interests represented and 
considered. In other words, these actions lead to other good things. Examples of this 
would be, as above, purported legitimacy, protection of interests and good decisions 
(Swift, 2014, pp. 221-229). This will therefore be a theoretical, a priori enquiry rather 
than an empirical one. This is because the nature of the argument is a normative one 
that looks at a decision-making ideal. It is primarily a probabilistic claim in that I 
argue that on balance, evidence-based decisions are more likely than evidence-aware 
ones to accurately diagnose a problem and then actually resolve it. I too argue that a 
knowledgeable minority are more likely to possess that understanding of evidence. 
 2QHRIWKHNH\ZRUGVWKDWZLOOEHXVHGLVµH[SHUW¶RUµH[SHUWV¶$VWKLVLVRI
such importance, it would be helpful to define this from the beginning. Steven Brint 
(1990) VD\VWKDWH[SHUWVKDYHVXFKDWLWOHGXHWRDQDVVHUWLRQRIWUDLQHGµNQRZOHGJH-
EDVHG¶DXWKRULW\7KH\DUHKLJKO\WUDLQHGSURIHVVLRQDOVWDIIZKRZRUNLQWKHFHQWUDO
institutional domains, such as scientific, cultural, information services, social services, 
medical, legal and educational organizations (Brint, 1990, p. 364). He contrasts these 
ZLWKµHOLWHV¶ZKRW\SLFDOO\RFFXS\FRPPDQGSRVWVDWWKHtop of these central 
institutional domains. They will have budgetary control and have the final say over 
changes in rules, objectives and organisation. As such, it is possible for a person to 
transition between the two (Brint, 1990, p. 364). Christopher Weible (2008) defines 
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experts as being policy analysts, scientists and researchers in government and non-
governmental organisations. Such people produce expert-based information, the 
sources of which include natural and social sciences, policy analyses, government 
reports and research coming from universities and think tanks (Weible, 2008, p. 616). 
These definitions are useful, but as will be seen from later pages, the policy process 
VKRXOGDOVRLQFOXGHWKHEURDGHUFRQFHSWRIµNQRZOHGJHDEOHPLQRULWLHV¶WKDWEHLQJWKH
embodiment of academic researchers, professional elites and ordinary people who 
work in a profession or industry.  
 Structurally, Chapter one (Democratic Theory) will outline the various main 
models of democracy and will focus upon the purported intrinsic and instrumental 
values that collectively they present. This contains the sub-chapters of Classical 
Democracy, Republican Democracy, and Modern Democracy. These will provide a 
guide through the history of democratic development and will arrive at the most 
modern discussions that will be referred to later on in the paper. The purpose of this 
chapter is to set the context for the argument that follows. Chapter two (Deliberative 
Democracy) will consider in detail this contemporary theory and contains the sub-
chapters of Overview of the Theory and Analysis and Criticism. These provide an 
account of the normative development of the theory from the works of Rawls and 
Habermas, to the modern works of writers like Guttman, Thompson, Barber and 
Bartlett. It then provides an analysis and criticism of the theory in line with the 
Service Democracy and concerns with popular knowledge imbalances. The purpose of 
this chapter is to give an account of an important contemporary theory and consider 
how this thesis will depart from it. Chapter three (Ignorant Majorities) will consider 
what past writers have to say on the competence of the average voter and contains the 
sub-chapters of Plato, John Stuart Mill, Competitive Elitism and finally Ignorant 
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Majorities and Knowledge Bases. These provide a chronological overview of the 
PDQQHULQZKLFKµJXDUGLDQVKLS¶WKHRULVWVYLHZWKHDELOLWLHVRIWKHFRPPRQPDQDQG
typically how they marginalise them in favour of more elite politicians. It will then 
provide an analysis of these in light of the view being developed that multiple ignorant 
majorities co-exist and each citizen has the potential to contribute what they know. 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce departures from such guardianship theories 
and provide an alternative that will lead into the next chapter. Chapter four (The 
Service Democracy) will attempt to outline an epistemic account of democratic 
legitimacy. It has the sub-chapters of Instrumental Values and the Better Decision, and 
The Service Democracy. ,WEHJLQVE\RXWOLQLQJZKDWLVPHDQWE\DµEHWWHUGHFLVLRQ¶
and explains that legitimacy should stem from the design of the procedure, and not 
each decision on a case-by-case basis. It then argues for instrumentalism through use 
of a reverse-contractarian argument and ends with an account of how policy creation 
could look if it is accepts that instrumentalism is a primary value of democracy and if 
the ignorant majorities observation is correct.  Chapter five (Application to Real-
World Politics) will consider the present policy process and how this could be 
reformed epistemically. It has the sub-chapters of The Public Policy Process and 
Epistemic Policy Proposals. It begins by considering a theoretical view of public 
policy from both the normative and descriptive angles. It then looks at the present 
criminal justice policy process and then ends with reform proposals, such as state 
funding of political parties, committee oversight of ministerial appointments and 





Chapter One  
Democratic Theory 
 
Where states exist and subsequently decisions need to be made, there are a 
variety of decision-making procedures that could be employed. For instance, a state 
may take the form of an absolute monarchy where one individual has the power to 
create law and exercise their will upon almost any aspect of life. Equally, a state may 
take the form of an elite group of decision-makers who are tasked with using their 
expertise and knowledge to further the interests of the citizenry and advance the 
common good. More profoundly, a state may take the form of a democracy where 
each citizen has the power to express their views and exercise a collective will over 
the direction of their nation, with each interest being given equal consideration. It is 
this final approach to decision-making that has, at least in modern times, seen greatest 
admiration and longevity and is what will be explored in this chapter.  
Democracy is considered to be one of the more successful governmental 
decision-making models devised by humanity. This is not to say that other systems of 
governance have not achieved some level of domestic popularity, economic success, 
law and order or healthcare and education for its citizens, but rather the manner in 
which such decisions are taken can be considered more legitimate. The famous quote 
IURP$EUDKDP/LQFROQ¶V*HWW\VEXUJ$GGUHVVLQ³*RYHUQPHQWRIWKHSHRSOHE\
the people, for tKHSHRSOH´FDQKLJKOight that the key component is noWµJRYHUQPHQWRI
WKHSHRSOH¶RUµIRUWKHSHRSOH¶EXWµE\WKHSHRSOH¶ (Swift, 2014, p. 189). The first two 
can be claimed by most regimes, but it is the latter that stipulates self-rule and thus 
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legitimising democracy (despite definitional issues with each constitutive part of the 
quote) (Held, 2006, p. 1). Such legitimacy stems from the fact that democracy, as its 
Greek etymological origins suggest, gives all people considered to be citizens an equal 
say in the proposition, structure and ultimate creation of the very laws that they will be 
subjected to. By allowing for this, any outcomes from this democratic system can be 
FRQVLGHUHGµIDLU¶ because of the manner in which they were created and the theoretical 
allowance to a plurality, if not all, viewpoints and opinions. Indeed, such a desire for 
increased legitimisation of decisions sees even quite blatantly undemocratic regimes 
try to declare themselves democratic and use such language (Dahl, 1989, p. 2).  
Even in its more contemporary form of representative democracy, legitimacy 
stems from the state having to validate its claims to be advancing the common good. 
The action of a state is based upon its will, but such a will must not be considered 
µJRRG¶SHUVHZLWKRXWH[WHUQDOHYDOXDWLRQIURPWKRVHVXEMHFWHGWRLW (Laski, 2008, p. 
440). It is through elections and post-election lobbying, and so through the collective 
voice, that judgement is passed and actions of the state are legitimised and accounted 
for. As such, public opinion functions as a check on the legitimacy of the powers and 
actions of government, ensuring that they are operated in favour of the common good 
(Finlayson, 2005, p. 10). 
7RSURSHUO\XQGHUVWDQGµGHPRFUDF\¶DVDFRQFHSWLWZRXOGEHSHUWLQHQWWR
consider its evolution in temporal terms and consider the various models and variants 
that have taken shape. As mentioned in the introduction, this overview will consider 
the purported intrinsic and instrumental values that are placed upon it.  The reason for 
this dichotomy is that it takes the form of traditional normative analysis within the 
theory of value (Schroeder, 2012). Intrinsic values are good in and of themselves, 
whereas instrumental values are good because they lead to an intrinsic value. After 
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this, an account of why instrumental values are very important will be given within 
the framework of a social contract theory. 
 
1.1 Classical Democracy 
 The dawn of democracy has its roots in the revolutionary manner in which the 
city-state of Athens organised itself after common domination by autocrats and tyrants 
around 500BC (Held, 2006, p. 11). Indeed, Athens was not the first, nor was it the 
only instance of democracy at the time, but it stands out as being a well-documented 
example of the life and operation of such an ancient democratic order (at least from 
the perspective of its critics at the time) (Hornblower, 1993, pp. 1-2). It was here that 
the generational development of democracy flourished and credit is given for the 
promotion of important political values, such as equality of the citizenry, liberty and 
justice.  
 
1.1.1  Political Ideals and Aims 
An important point to firstly make is that Athens operated a system of direct 
democracy and this required each citizen to be actively engaged in the affairs of the 
demos. With this, the public and private lives of citizens were interlinked and as 
3HULFOHVSXWVLW³:HGRQRWVD\WKDWDPDQZKRWDNHVQRLQWHUHVWLQSROLWLFVLVDPDQ
who minds his own business; we say that he has no busineVVKHUHDWDOO´ (Held, 2006, 
p. 14). This was seen as something natural; an activity that was simply an extension of 
the human condition (Dahl, 1989, p. 18). 
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It was believed that the best way to fully enhance oneself morally was to be 
involved in political affairs and community (Lee, 1974, p. 32). As such, life in the 
polis was the best way to educate oneself, meaning simply looking at things 
academically was not enough (Dahl, 1989, p. 15). Despite this seemingly being 
demanding, it was not considered to be limiting to their autonomy and freedom, but in 
fact a way of enhancing it (Farrar, 1993, p. 37). Such a position appears to be similar 
to a conception of positive freedom (Swift, 2014, pp. 69-73) in that each citizen, by 
partaking in politics, was exercising their right to decide over their lives and the 
collective direction of the demos. A distinction was drawn between the arbitrary 
VXEMHFWLRQWRDQRWKHU¶VZLOODQGWKHREOLJDWLRQWRUHVSHFWDOHJLWLPDWHDQGVHOI-made 
law (Sabine, 1963, p. 18). Aristotle, despite disliking the Athenian democratic system 
and constitution, explained that one of the basic propositions of the constitution was 
liberty. +HZURWHWKDWµUXOLQJDQGEHLQJUXOHGLQWXUQLVRQHHOHPHQWRIOLEHUW\¶ based 
upon equality (Aristotle, 1992, p. 362). In so far as possible though, a man should live 
as he likes otherwise he is akin to a slave. 
 Linked in with the above was their conception of justice. Unlike modern day 
views on justice that relate to ethical moral judgements about what is fair, or what is 
right, the Ancient Greek perspective related to behaving in a manner that was 
considered symbiotic with the community and group (Guthrie, 1975, pp. 5-7). By 
participating in the affairs of the dHPRVDQGSXEOLFOLIHDFLWL]HQFRXOGµIXOILOKLV
PDWHULDOSRZHUVDQGWKHWHORVJRDORUREMHFWLYHRIWKHFRPPRQJRRG¶ (Held, 2006, p. 
15). In the same light, Plato linked societal constitutions with individual internal 
constitutions in that both, to be just, must promote the common good (Lane, 2007, p. 
26) (which further cemented the idea of an interlinked public and private life). Justice 
was therefore something that both an individual and a government should aim for, as 
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they were co-dependent. A person who pursues their own interests could not be 
regarded as a good citizen (Dahl, 1989, p. 15). Justice also relied upon the social 
attitudes and the laws of tKHWLPH$ULVWRWOHZURWHWKDW³ZKDWHYHUWKHPDMRULW\GHFLGHV
LVILQDODQGFRQVWLWXWHVMXVWLFH´ (Aristotle, 1992, pp. 362-363). Justice therefore was a 
type of numerical equality where the multitude was sovereign (Held, 2006, p. 15). 
Theoretically then, such a concept of justice could alter and change; it was fluid and 
dynamic. 
 
1.1.2  Citizenship and Institutions 
 Despite the promotion of equality among citizens as suggested above, the 
Ancient Greek concept of citizenship was one that was extremely exclusive and did 
not include many members of Athenian society. Ultimately it was a patriarchy that 
was open to Athenian men over the age of 20 (Held, 2006, p. 19). This meant that 
women, immigrants and slaves were not eligible (Dickinson, 1997, pp. 38-63) and this 
could possibly call into question the very labelling of it as a democracy by modern 
standards (Held, 2006, p. 19). Considering that the majority of actual members of 
Athenian society did not have any political power or influence, it was very much a 
µW\UDQQ\RIWKHPLQRULW\¶ZLWKWKHRQO\LQWHUHVWVUHSUHVHQWHGEHLQJWKDWRIZHDOWKLer, 
native males. Indeed, any cynic of modern Western democratic societies may claim 
that not much has altered in this regard. 
 Structurally speaking, the most important chamber of decision making was 
The Assembly. This allowed for any citizen to attend up to 40 sessions per anum, but 
did have a quorum set at 6,000 (Held, 2006, p. 17). Issues for deliberation ranged from 
finance and the maintenance of order, to foreign affairs and expulsions. As would be 
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imagined, not everything would be agreed upon and so in the event that there was not 
unanimity, a vote would be taken and the majority verdict would prevail (Larsen, 
1948), much as Aristotle described earlier. Naturally, such a large body could not 
organise the more bureaucratic elements of governance and so a Council of 500 would 
act as a steering group. This would create draft laws, receive proposals and prepare an 
agenda for each meeting (Held, 2006, p. 18). The Council was further aided by the 
Committee of 50 who would help to guide and make proposals to the Council, but the 
people comprising the Committee would only sit for one month, and it¶s President for 
one day. Such a revolving occupancy showed $WKHQV¶FRmmitment to ensuring that as 
many people as possible had the chance to be involved at all levels of government. 
 
1.1.3  Summary 
As can been seen from the above, the Ancient Greek democracy starts to give 
a glimpse of the various values and ideals that democracy can have. It promotes 
political equality among its citizens, a strong sense of communal involvement, 
personal moral development and finally concepts of freedom and liberty. Such values 
will reappear in later democratic theory and in this sense they are extremely important. 
However, due to not recognising the now distinctive realms of public and private life, 
rights that protect people from the state would not have been recognised.  
 
1.2 Republican Democracy 
 Republicanism is the next step in the histoULFDORYHUYLHZRIGHPRFUDF\¶V
evolution. Like democracy, Republicanism finds itself with various strands that have 
emerged with time and have been applied to different regimes. Republics, as shall be 
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seen, share similarities with the classical account of democracy, but will also have 
some features that would not have been recognised by city-states such as Athens. The 
historical re-emergence of city-democracies, or in this instance city-republics, came in 
eleventh century Italy within the context of feudal Europe (Skinner, 1993, p. 59).   
 
1.2.1  Italian City-Republics 
 In spite of claims by others to control over these territories, cities within Italy 
(such as Florence and Milan) created their own consuls who would rule over their 
legal and judicial matters (Skinner, 1993, p. 57). This soon evolved into having 
elected ruling councils who had control over executive as well as judicial matters, 
headed by officials appointed from members of the council. Despite this seemingly 
important breakthrough at a time of domination by Monarchs, the citizenry was 
heavily restricted like Athens. It comprised of male householders who owned taxable 
property and who were born or of continuous residency in the area (Held, 2006, p. 
32). Equally, the top positions were occupied by noblemen and this would create 
animosity and even violence. It would be better to refer to such regimes as aristocratic 
republicanism, rather than outright democratic republicanism (Held, 2006, p. 33).  
These saw a role for the people, but a more limited one which comprised of simply 
choosing leaders who would govern day-to-day (Dahl, 1989, p. 26). 
 Whilst there are again important criticisms about the possibility of such 
regimes not really being democratic by modern accepted standards, they did help to 
develop further arguments in favour of self-government, self-determination and 
popular sovereignty (Held, 2006, p. 34). These key ideas rested upon their being no 
higher authority than that of the people themselves. This is the basis of liberty for all, 
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and allows individuals to pursue their chosen ends in a free, autonomous manner and 
was the mark of civic freedom (Skinner, 1989, p. 105). These values were inspired, 
not by Athens, but by the Roman Republic (509BC to 29BC).  
 
1.2.2  The Roman Republic 
Rome created a model of governance that equated liberty with virtue 
(patriotism and public spirit (Canovan, 1987, p. 434), akin to the Athenian concept of 
justice), civic glory and military conquest, which was considered attractive by the 
Italian cities. As with Athens though, freedom meant being free from the arbitrary will 
of tyrants, and meant citizens could be free to engage in self-governance. For Roman 
historian and politician Gaius Sallustius Crispus (anglicised to Sallust), once civic 
glory had been achieved by the Republic, citizens could then turn their attention to 
their own personal glories. As such, virtue lead to liberty of the individual (Crispus, 
2007, p. 178).  
 
1.2.3  Developmental and Protective Republicanism 
Used by David Held (2006, p. 35), these terms can explain a distinction 
between the two main approaches to renaissance republicanism. Developmental 
republicanism focuses upon the intrinsic values of democracy and developmental 
benefits of popular participation for citizens, with writers including Marsilius of Padua 
(1275-1342), Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1712 ± 1778) and Mary Wollstonecraft (1759 ± 
1797). Inspiration came from the writings of Greek philosophers. Protective 
republicanism stresses the need for people to be involved in democracy as this is the 
best way to protect their liberty. Writers here include Niccolo Machiavelli (1469 ± 
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1527), Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu (known as 
Montesquieu) (1689-1755) and James Madison (1751 ± 1836). Inspiration here came 
from the Roman Republic and its writers. 
Considering that the dichotomy of intrinsic and instrumental values is 
discussed by these writers, it would be sensible to have a brief look at what some of 
them said. The earliest writer mentioned is Marsilius of Padua. For him, all laws 
should be made by the people or a majority if unanimity could not be sought. 
Importantly for the time, he advocated a secular government that was not influenced 
or ruled over by religious interests (Held, 2006, p. 36). For Alan Gewirth (1951), there 
were three major themes in his work. The first was an emphasis upon civil 
communities and the Government should act in the interests of the common good and 
not private interests. The second is that the Government should have a unitary 
coercive force that allows it to maintain peace and order, as well as regulating civic 
affairs. The final theme is that the source of legitimate political authority is to be 
found within the people themselves (Padua, 2001, p. 32). The people are to pass 
judgement and require the Government to validate its claims to be acting towards the 
common good. Equally, laws are better observed by the citizens if they have a hand in 
creating them and imposing them upon themselves. It is for this reason that any 
elected representatives were considered delegates (Padua, 2001, p. 45) who could only 
rule in accordance with the authority of the people. In line with the Athenian approach 
to citizenship, citizens were expected to partake in communal affairs and functions as 
this was the best way to achieve the common good. Such a status, though, was limited 
to native men (Padua, 2001, p. 46). 
In light of declining city-republics, it was Niccolo Machiavelli who was able 
to reinvigorate the arguments in favour of republicanism, but from the protective 
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perspective. He was able to do this by adopting a more Roman approach by fusing 
civic health with civic glory (Held, 2006, p. 40). The main level of enquiry was to ask 
under what circumstances might people support a political order? How might the 
willingness to pursue the common good be instilled in the people? This, he felt, could 
be answered by having an enforced legal system and by having religious worship 
(Skinner, 1981, p. 52).  He sought to explore a more appropriate balance between the 
power of the Government and the power of the citizenry, which allowed him to arrive 
DWDµPL[HGJRYHUQPHQW¶V\VWHPWKDWEDODQFHGFRPSHWLQJVRFLDOLQWHUHVWV,WZDVKLV
desire to bring together the rich and the poor to make common laws and that these 
laws would reflect compromises from all sides (Skinner, 1981, p. 63).  
Liberty was an important value for Machiavelli and historically speaking it 
was those societies that possessed greater levels of liberty that appeared to flourish 
(such as Athens and Rome). To create and preserve such liberty, it was correct to have 
a mixed government to quell internal factions, but it was similarly necessary to quell 
external threats to liberty from competing states and governments who may wish to 
invade. With this he advocated the use of force at home and abroad in order to 
maintain freedom. As with other writers and Athens, he did not make much distinction 
between public and private life and the requirements of state took precedence over the 
rights of individuals (Held, 2006, p. 42). 
A powerful restatement of developmental republicanism came from Jean-
Jacques Rousseau. Like writers before him, Rousseau emphasised the importance of 
participation in the polis and how such self-governance was a necessary condition of 
liberty and freedom (Held, 2006, p. 43). Despite this, he was critical of the Athenian 
system structurally speaking because it failed to separate its legislative and executive 
functions, which lead to unrest and internal strife (Rousseau, 1968, p. 112). In his 
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work The Social Contract, Rousseau uses a hypothetical state of nature to explain how 
people moved from anarchy into governmental states with common institutions and 
laws. This was due to a belief that their survival, development of human nature and 
experience the liberty could all be maximised under such a government (Rousseau, 
1968, p. 59).  
Importantly for this enquiry, Rousseau saw self-rule as an end in itself, and 
intrinsic value that only democracy could provide. Self-imposed laws were essentially 
a type of autonomy and this is intrinsic to democracy. Irrespective of the outcome of 
the laws, the very fact they were self-created is freedom-enhancing (Swift, 2014, p. 
212). Even in the event that a minority is outvoted and no longer lives under a law 
they chose, there still remains a freedom in that they were able to participate and their 
interested considered. With this, it was important for citizens to actively involve 
themselves in public affairs. Unlike other writers, he did not support any distinction 
between public and private because for him, ultimate sovereignty was with the people 
and any public officials were simply agents of the people and so had no independent 
power to make law themselves. Laws had to be ratified by the public, unlike in 
representative systems where the representatives had the power to make the laws on 
behalf of the people (Rousseau, 1968, p. 141). Despite this view, in later works 
Rousseau did express support for representatives where states were large (Franlin, 
1978, pp. 75-76) In the event that there was disagreement, the majority verdict would 
SUHYDLODQGWKLVZRXOGELQGDOO6XFKDYHUGLFWWKRXJKPXVWFRQVLGHUWKHµJHQHUDO
ZLOO¶LHYoters must be considering what is best for the common good, and not what 
is best for their own personal interests. 
Liberty was also an important value and he gave a succinct statement on the 
difference between true independence and true liberty. The former relate to doing 
20 
 
precisely what one wants, irrespective of the consequences for others. As can be 
imagined, if everyone did this human existence would be quite bleak and full of 
conflict. Whereas Liberty involved doing what one wanted to so long as it did not 
result in the imposition of one will over another (Rousseau, 1968, p. 46). Only through 
participation in politics could a person navigate this distinction and as such rules 
would apply to all equally, each person would enjoy the same rights and privileges. In 
order to achieve liberty, it was necessary to try and tackle vast inequalities in society. 
Those that had greater wealth and power would ultimately have a greater ability to 
influence and do as they wish with possibly impunity. To prevent this, he desired a 
VRFLHW\ZKHUH³QRFLWL]HQVKDOOEHULFKHQRXJKWREX\DQRWKHUDQGQRQHVRSRRUDVWR
EHIRUFHGWRVHOOKLPVHOI´ (Rousseau, 1968, p. 96). In this state, the factions that 
typically would arise between rich and poor were less likely to occur, and so a 
MXGJHPHQWRQWKHµJHQHUDOZLOO¶ZDVHDVLHUWRREWDLQ 
His vision was set within a system that had clear separation of powers between 
executive and legislature. The former was for officials who would enact and organise 
the decisions of the latter, the reserve of the people. 
 
1.2.4  Summary 
 Republicanism has a very rich history and the variety tends to reflect the 
political circumstances at the time of writing. However, common themes and values 
can be deciphered. Within the developmental tradition, the intrinsic values that are 
argued for relate to the importance of being involved with public life so as to develop 
themselves and the common good. Citizenship plays a very central role in such 
thinking. Equally, political equality acts as an important way to preserve liberty 
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because of how commonly made rules can help to navigate the difficulties that 
independence can present and ensure there is no domination of certain wills over 
others. Such a view of equality, where no one is more morally qualified to govern and 
impose their will than any other, KDVEHHQWHUPHGWKHµVWURQJSULQFLSOHRIHTXDOLW\¶E\
Dahl (1989, p. 31). Finally, freedom as self-rule is advanced by Rousseau in that the 
ability to create the very laws that are then imposed is a type of freedom that only 
democracy can give. 
 Within the protective tradition, Machiavelli highlights how political 
participation of all people, in a mixed government, is the best way to protect interests 
and create common laws that should both reflect such interests and reflect 
compromises. Again, this highlights a way in which to preserve liberty. 
 
1.3 Modern Democracy 
 This section aims to consider briefly more modern conceptions of democracy 
that have relevance for the times in which this thesis is being written. It shall cover 
Liberal Democracy; a model that has shaped democracy for centuries and it shall 
consider very modern discussions on deliberative democracy. Again, the purpose of 
this is to set a context for later discussions that will refer back to these and will refer 
back to the values that they advocate and inspire. 
 
1.3.1  Liberal Democracy 
 Along with republicanism, liberal democracy stood as an alternative vision of 
government to the monarchies that prevailed during the medieval period. Writers here 
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include aspects of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), Jeremy 
Bentham (1748 ± 1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806 ± 1873). In brief, liberal 
democratic approaches sought to clearly define public and private spheres and in 
doing so restrict the powers of the Church and Government from excessive 
interference in civil society (Held, 2006, p. 59). With this, values emerged that upheld 
freedom of choice, toleration for others and moral reason. One concern that the liberal 
democratic theorists had to overcome was how to appropriately balance the power of 
the state (that had a complete monopoly over coercive power) and the rights of 
individuals to pursue their own ends, both socially and economically. Answers to such 
questions have been attempted, and these also split into two categories; developmental 
and protective. The distinction is similar to that found in republicanism in that the 
developmentals believe that political participation is a desirable end in itself, whereas 
the protectives believe that the only way to protect interests and prevent domination 
by others is to create strong institutions (Held, 2006, p. 60).  
 In terms of beginning of such thought, the work of Thomas Hobbes in The 
Leviathan (2008) is of importance. Here, Hobbes used the concept of the state of 
nature to explain how and why humans hypothetically found it necessary to leave that 
state and create government and states. Essentially, the reason for people to lay down 
their rights of self-government would be in exchange for the strong political 
leadership of a single authority and the security and protection that would bring 
(Skinner, 1989, p. 112). This did not necessarily have to be an individual monarch, as 
it could have also been an assembly (Hobbes, 2008, pp. 82-85). It is right here that 
Hobbes enters the debates on the limits of state power. His vision is liberal in that 
Hobbes aimed to find the best circumstances under which humans could flourish, and 
that this required a consensual agreement to be subjected to the authority of the 
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Sovereign. However, his vision clearly lacks in liberality in that the making of laws is 
not done by the citizens themselves, but for them by the powerful Sovereign. As such, 
despite liberal beginnings of free people coming together consensually, he ends up 
with a vision of domination and enforced wills against the citizen. This meant that the 
state clearly had the scales tipped in its favour (Held, 2006, p. 63). 
-RKQ/RFNHIRXQGLVVXHZLWK+REEHV¶6Rvereign approach and felt that there 
were other ways of living in peace and security without completely submitting to the 
will of a supreme authority. This began the protective democracy tradition. For Locke, 
the purpose of government was to help protect the rights to life, liberty and estate of 
the citizens in the state (Dunn, 1969, pp. 19-26). It is clear then that government and 
democracy were seen as instruments to achieve an end, and not necessarily an end of 
itself. In common with Hobbes, Locke also accepted the µstate of nature¶ argument 
and felt that humans existed without government, but with natural rights. Unlike 
Hobbes who felt the state of nature would be ³VROLWDU\SRRUnasty, brutish and short´ 
(Hobbes, 2008, p. 84), Locke felt that existence in this state would have been without 
war and occupied by rational beings capable of respecting HDFKRWKHU¶V natural rights. 
However, due to not everyone wishing to respect the rights of others, it would be 
down to the individual victims to enforce the natural law and this would see 
widespread impunity or inconsistent interpretations of the said laws. As such, 
violations of property rights would potentially be rife (Locke, 1980, p. 308).  
The remedy for such inconveniences would be the creation of an agreement 
that would create both an independent society and a government (Locke, 1980, p. 
372). Highlighting the departure from the Hobbsian view, authority is given to a 
government for the express purpose of pursing ends of the governed. If the people 
pass judgement and feel that the government cannot validate its claims to be acting in 
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the common good, the people can dissolve the government (Locke, 1980, p. 110). In 
terms of the values of democracy, political involvement is very much instrumental for 
Locke (Held, 2006, p. 64). Through the creation of governmental institutions, citizens 
are best able to secure and protect their private affairs and private property. Indeed, 
this does require the sacrifice of complete self-government and autonomy, but on 
balance such a state of affairs is more beneficial.  So long as the government was 
satisfactorily constrained, then freedom could still exist but in a slightly more limited 
way (Rabe, 1994, pp. 291-311). 
The next writer of interest was Montesquieu (who was also mentioned above 
under protective republicanism). +HKHOSHGWRH[SDQGXSRQ/RFNH¶VLQVWDQFHXSRQD
separation of powers and provided a more institutional framework for the operations 
of a liberal democratic state.  Of interest here are his views on liberty and freedom. 
For Montesquieu, liberty meant acting as one wished within the confines of the law 
(Montesquieu, 2010, p. 70). However, this can be problematic because it would 
suggest that liberty is dependent upon what was socially acceptable, and it would 
suggest that the law could never be used to enhance freedom, because by definition 
freedom was at its maximum limit whatever the law was (Held, 2006, p. 69). In spite 
of this, he and Locke agreed that the best way to protect liberty was through the 
creation of political equality and the equal ability to express and defend their interests 
against a state that is tasked with protecting private rights (Held, 2006, p. 70). 
Further elaboration of protective democratic thought came from the utilitarian 
thinker Jeremy Bentham. He rejected outright the state of nature and the social 
contract arguments as being fictitious and they did not account for true human desire 
and motivation. This, of course, came from the maximisation of pleasures and the 
avoidances of pain (Bentham, 2012). As such, it was for government institutions to be 
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sufficiently accountable to the public so as to ensure they are acting in compliance 
with utility maximising principles and truly aggregating public ultility. The state 
became, like with Locke, a means of helping people to achieve private satisfaction and 
played the role of an arbiter among interacting moral agents. Freedom from an 
overarching state was important and, as is inherent within utilitarian thinking, equality 
of interests was paramount for protecting liberty. When aggregating individual 
desires, it was not for the state to judge or censor what went into the felicific 
calculation; each interest would be treated equally, irrespective of how unconventional 
it may be. Behind this approach was a belief that from the moral point of view, each 
person life matters equally (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 32) and their right to pursue their own 
ends was important. 
The final important proponent of liberal democracy came with the more 
developmental writings of John Stuart Mill. The establishment of boundaries between 
the state and the individual was imporWDQWIRUWKHµIUHHGHYHORSPHQWRILQGLYLGXDOLW\¶ 
(Held, 2006, p. 79) and participation in political affairs was very important for 
remaining informed and developing intellectual reasoning. Equally, involvement 
allowed for an individual to engage in moral self-development (Dunn, 1979, p. 52). 
He also believed passionately about the protection of freedom and liberty. His famous 
work On Liberty (Mill, 2005) explored and described the proper limits of legitimate 
power that the state could wield over the individual. In essence, this boiled down to 
KLVKDUPSULQFLSOHWKDWDOORZHGIRUIUHHDFWLRQVRORQJDVLWGRHVQRWµKDUP¶RWKHUV 
(Mill, 2005, p. 72). Within this, Mill defended some very important liberties that 
should not be interfered with, such as freedom of thought, feeling, speech, publication, 




(Held, 2006, p. 81). Through the pursuit of free economic exchange and coupled with 
minimal state interference, individuals can best maximise the benefits of political 
association and importantly for Mill, engage in self-development (Held, 2006, p. 87). 
 
1.3.2  Deliberative Democracy 
 Liberal democracy has helped to describe the general foundations of the 
modern democratic state. It focused upon the limiting of governmental action to 
feasible limits, so as to allow for liberty and freedom to be maximised. However, 
deliberative democracy, a very contemporary version of democracy, aims to discuss 
VRPHWKLQJGLIIHUHQWWKHTXDOLW\RIGHPRFUDF\,WVSURSRQHQWVDGYRFDWHµLQIRUPHG
GHEDWHWKHSXEOLFXVHRIUHDVRQDQGWKHLPSDUWLDOSXUVXLWRIWUXWK¶ (Held, 2006, p. 
232).  
 One of the main concerns that the writers seek to address relates to the nature 
of the knowledge citizens possess. Should democracy be built around simply the will 
RIWKHFLWL]HQVRUVKRXOGWKDWµZLOO¶EHDVVHVVHGWRVHHLILWLVUDWLRQDODQGUHDVRQDEOH"
This stands in contrast to utilitarianism where interests are not to a far lesser extent 
assessed. For Offe and Preuss, a reasonable will is one that considers facts, the future 
as well as the present and finally considers other people (Offe & Preuss, 1991, p. 156). 
Democracies should steer political thinking beyond the everyday assumptions and 
notions that ordinary people will presently possess, and instead build a political will 
that is reasoned. Offe and Preuss argue that simply participating in political life does 
appear to wield any particular, measurable benefits to the participants. This appears to 
be an attack upon one of the intrinsic values espoused by multiple thinkers through 
democratic history. However, they qualify this by saying that institutions and 
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constitutions should actively be designed test, teach and encourage learning within 
public and private life (Offe & Preuss, 1991, p. 169). 
 Writers such as Fiskin argue that political life is increasingly media driven and 
devoid of ideas (Fiskin, 1991, p. 19). John Dryzek expressly criticises what he sees to 
be increasing instrumentalism within politics that results in power resting in the hands 
of experts who are isolated in their expertise and so struggle to create coherent visions 
and policies that give a state a complete direction (Dryzek, 1990, p. 54). 
 
1.3.3  Summary 
 Liberal democracy has certainly played a very influential role in the formation 
of modern democracies and crucially in informing the values that they are built upon. 
Unlike republicanism, liberalism has insisted on defining clearly the spheres of public 
and private life that allows for maximum liberty and freedom, as well as ensuring that 
citizens can flourish through the equal participation in public life. The predominant 
YLHZZDVWKDWJRYHUQPHQWZDVDPHDQVWRVHFXULW\LQWHUHVWVUDWKHUWKDQEHLQJµJRRG¶
in and of itself. Whilst this has not be challenged by deliberative democracy, 
deliberation does highlight very important points about the nature of individual 
NQRZOHGJHDQGLILWLVILWIRUSXUSRVHZKHQPDNLQJGHFLVLRQVRYHURWKHUSHRSOH¶VOLYHV
It does though argue in favour of participation within a learning culture and assuming 
such a culture could exist, then participation would be a great way to develop as a 





1.4  The Origin of Instrumental Values - Social Contract Theory 
 The operation of an instrumental-orientated democratic theory shall be 
accounted for in later chapters, but here I will attempt to provide my first of two 
arguments as to why it is the instrumental set of values that must be considered 
primary to intrinsic ones. This emphasis upon the instrumental must be justified in 
order to deflect some criticism about the potential ignoring of intrinsic values. 
Historically speaking, nations and political systems have been born out of violence, 
war, oppression and coercion. National leaders would have typically won their 
positions on a battle field, or occupied them due to a hereditary divine right. Any form 
of popular consent related simply to the choice to not rebel and fight a civil war, as 
opposed to having elections and taking part in decision making. However, in Western 
society at least, we have arrived at a position where we live in a liberal democracy and 
theoretically have the ability to exercise a collective autonomy not seen in past 
political systems. The moment that it could be said we were a free people, 
autonomous destiny opened up. As such we, broadly speaking, have the capacity and 
ability to decide collectively how we would like to live and associate with each other. 
We therefore enjoy choice and have the power to, say, dissolve Parliament and install 
a dictatorship, dissolve government all together and exist in anarcho-capitalistic 
association (or some other form of a state of nature) or indeed maintain some form of 
government and democracy. From this position of freedom, and having democratic 
chambers to decide, we can assess these possible future options. For me, this 
observation that I make is important and I would term this philosophical device a 
µUHYHUVH-FRQWUDFWDULDQ¶SRVLWLRQLQWKDWLWORRNVSURVSHFWLYHO\WRZKDWZHFRXOGEH
instead of looking retrospectively at how we came to be. The social contract thus 
becomes a tool of the present, as opposed to an explanation from the past.  
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Traditional social contractarian theories of the State look retrospectively at 
how a State, hypothetically, came into being. They typically outline how, at some 
point in time, there was a pre-State position known as the state of nature where 
humans lived unsatisfactory lives (at least in the sense they felt a state would be a 
better proposition). From there, political authority is reasoned into existence through 
the creation of a social contract that governs vertical and horizontal relationships. 
Such political authority would bring about certain ends that would not otherwise have 
been achievable in the state of nature, such as property and personal security. 
However, a main criticism levelled at such approaches are that they do not reflect 
historical realities of how political authority and States actually came into existence, 
the various failings of humans in the state of nature may not be solved by this contract 
(Hampton, 1987, pp. 189-207), and hypothetical, fictitious agreements do not have the 
force of actual ones. However, a reverse-contractarian approach is not open to the 
same criticisms because the starting position reflects the historical political reality and 
then recognises that due to gradual constitutional reform, many publics globally 
possess the necessary and requisite sovereignty and autonomy to actually decide their 
fate and construct agreements.  
From this position, the arguments in favour of the establishment of political 
DXWKRULW\DQGDVWDWHFDQSURSHUO\DSSO\7KHUHIRUHIURP-RKQ/RFNH¶VSHUVSHFWLYHIRU
example, his argument that a state would be an effective arbiter between parties to 
resolve property disputes can still hold as a prospective argument. Indeed, this would 
also allow for John Rawls to rationally place his social contract negotiations within 
the scope of reality (albeit not necessarily in relation to the original position under a 
veil of ignorance, which is less so). What is important to note here is the nature of 
these arguments in relation to the previously mentioned intrinsic / instrumental 
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dichotomy of values. It will be argued here that the primary considerations made when 
assessing the viability of political authority are instrumental ones. As noted, Locke 
placed value upon the way the state can be an arbiter of property dispute and so come 
to reasonable decisions in such cases. Thomas Hobbes in The Leviathan believed that 
only through the creation of a monarch-like head of society could order and security 
be achieved and maintained. As noted in the first chapter, Jean Jacques Rousseau in 
The Social Contract EHOLHYHGWKDWWKHSHRSOH¶VVXUYLYDOGHYelopment of human nature 
and experience of liberty could all be maximised under a government (Rousseau, 
1968, p. 59).  
I would certainly though take issue with his last two offerings. I would not 
object to the argument that a state can inspire human social interaction as a matter of 
course (but this is not per se limited in a state of nature either), but arguments about 
educational and moral advancement are a little redundant. As argued by John Stuart 
Mill, participation in politics is considered to impart the intrinsic values of education 
due to the very fact that participation requires knowledge of the subject matter being 
debated. The desire to debate better and understand the issues better inspires the 
citizenry to research for themselves self-educate, as well as the act of debating 
LQIRUPLQJSHRSOHRIRWKHUWKLQJVWKH\GLGQ¶WNQRZ. However, the flaw with this is that 
the education pertains to the political sphere, yet in a state of nature such a sphere 
does not exist and so knowledge of one is not needed. Therefore to argue that 
government is better due to inspiring education does not hold because the education it 
inspires relates to something that is not necessary in anarchy and so this purported 
intrinsic value of a polity cannot be seen as an advantage. Why would a person need 
to know about how a Parliament works, or aspects of political philosophy, if they live 
in anarchism?  
31 
 
Further issue is taken with the assumption that government gives greater 
liberty and freedom than would be available in the state of nature. As seen in chapter 
one, Rousseau believed that self-governance was a necessary condition of liberty and 
freedom, and as such government was necessary in the form of democracy. The very 
fact that laws are self-created is automatically freedom enhancing (Swift, 2014, p. 
212). Equally, liberty (which he clearly distinguished from independence) meant an 
ability to act so long as it did not mean an imposition of one will over another 
(Rousseau, 1968, p. 46). 7KLVRIFRXUVHVKRZVVLPLODULW\ZLWK,VLDK%HUOLQ¶VQHJDWLYH
liberty (Berlin, 1969, pp. 120-125). As such, democracy offered a way to navigate this 
within a polity. I would accept that of the governmental systems available, democracy 
certainly does offer greater scope for negative liberty and freedom. When compared to 
monarchy or a dictatorship, democracy offers something of merit here. However, to 
claim that democracy and government can offer greater levels of negative liberty and 
freedom than within a state of nature seems a little farfetched. Indeed, I would argue 
that the imposition of government naturally diminishes autonomy and freedom. By its 
very nature, broad conformity to the processes and legal outcomes (decided by a 
majority) is required for the system to function. As seen in the first chapter, Rousseau 
outlines how part of liberty is simply the ability to take part in the decision-making 
process, as well as conformity to the majority verdict, or general will. This though 
seems quite odd. To say that you have freedom because you got a vote, yet the very 
decision taken would have been the will of a majority and so would be forcing you to 
do something you may not agree with. Does such a person have liberty or not? The 
protective republican tradition, alternatively, took the view that participation was 
needed to protect liberty. Indeed this is the position taken by liberal democracy 
proponents also. It does then beg the question of why a person would need to protect 
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their liberty within a democratic system that purportedly provides liberty. To me, it is 
clear that a state operating democracy can be a threat to negative liberty and so 
requires individuals to monitor this and intervene where necessary to protect their 
interests. As such, to claim that democracy is valuable because of the liberty it 
provides is in my view unpersuasive. It provides more negative liberty than other 
systems of governance, but where all types of human organisation are considered, it 
does not provide the maximum liberty. Therefore if we go back to our reverse-
FRQWUDFWDULDQµRULJLQDOSRVLWLRQ¶ZKHUHKLVWRULFDOO\ZHKDYHDUULYHGDWDQDELOLW\WR
collectively decide our fate, I do not think it would be argued that democratic 
JRYHUQDQFHVKRXOGEHFKRVHQEHFDXVHLWµJLYHVOLEHUW\¶EHFDXVHLWGRHVQRWLQWKLV
sense. Liberty exists within anarchy, and is then eroded once governments of any form 
are implemented. May it be the requirement to pay taxation under threat of coercion, 
or the ability to demand behavioural submission under a common law, democratic 
governments are not bringers of freedom when compared to a state of nature. It is 
instead known to all that sacrifices have to be made in this regard for greater 
instrumental aims of government.  
:LWKUHJDUGWR%HUOLQ¶VVHFRQGFRQFHSWRIOLEHUW\SRVLWLYHOLEHUW\LWZRXOG
seem this has a stronger claim. Here, liberty is realised, or self-mastery s realised, 
through setting a person free of the constraints nature has placed upon them. As Berlin 
SXWLWµ,ZLVKWREHDsubject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious 
purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affeFWPHDVLWZHUHIURPRXWVLGH¶
(Berlin, 1969, p. 125). As such, it would appear that a collective entity is necessary to 
bring about these conditions of positive liberty and so provide equal opportunities 
ZLWKLQDSHUVRQ¶VOLIH:KLOVW,DFNQRZOHGJHDVWDWHLVQHFHVVDU\WRGRWKLV, I do not 
accept that positive liberty is an intrinsic value of democracy. Previously discussed 
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intrinsic values are things that naturally occur as democracy occurs, such as education 
or equality of participation. However positive freedom requires steps to be taken to 
µEULQJLWDERXW¶LHLWLVQ¶WQDWXUDOWKURXJKWKHFRXUVHRIHYHQWV$VVXFK,ZRXOG
characterise this as an instrumental value and so does not provide an obstacle to my 
argument. 
 Leading on from this, democratic governance would be argued for because of 
the instrumental things it brings. Again, for Locke this was the fair resolution of 
property disputes. In modern societies, the democratic state has the capacity to provide 
services, bring about social equalities (such as equality of men and women or of races) 
and remove discriminations, tackle crime and civil disputes, defend the realm, provide 
education (and in the case of the United Kingdom, health care). These are all actions 
of a State that are routinely delivered and from that original position they are things 
that a State can provide in a positive sense as opposed to eroding things that would 
have otherwise existed to a greater degree in anarchy. Normal normative theory in 
democracy finds legitimacy in the procedure treating voters equally, which is an ex 
post facto merit (Estlund, 2008, p. 98). As mentioned previously however, intrinsic 
and instrumental values do not nicely sit together and typically can hinder one 
another. As Landemore acknowledges, there is a trade-off between procedural fairness 
and epistemic competence (Landemore, 2013, p. 14). We cannot both demand the 
maximum equality of participation, but then also demand maximum good outcomes. 
As the plurality of ignorant majority shows, this does not work in practise. The only 
way these do sit together is if some sacrifice is made by both. 
 If it is accepted that the primary functions and acknowledged benefits of 
Government are instrumental, then the democratic decision making procedure used to 
run the nation must be complementary to such acknowledgments. I do believe 
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instrumentality is the rational basis of justifications for a state (and a democratic 
decision-making procedure is preferred due to the way it can tap into the natural 
knowledge bases within society), which leads me on in later chapters (noticeably 
chapter four) to a discussion of how that decision making procedure should operate in 
practise in light of the plurality of ignorant majorities that exist and how to harness 
this to maximise the quality of outcomes as is desired by that rational public in the 
reverse-contractarian original position. 
 
Conclusion 
 Democracy has taken a variety of forms throughout its history. These forms 
tend to reflect the times in which the respective theories were written, and shows great 
resilience and an ability to evolve. Part of this evolution has been an evolution of 
values that shape it. As has been seen, Athens began with great emphasis upon 
political participation being the best and most just way to exist as a human. There 
could be no greater exposition of democracy having intrinsic values. Republicanism 
also shared in this belief and argued that freedom and liberty could be realised through 
active involvement in the creation of self-imposed laws.. However, the participation of 
mixed groups could help to realise and secure interests. Finally liberalism gave the 
greatest formulation of the protection of the individual and how participation could 
secure this.  
In terms of the instrumental/intrinsic value debate, I have provided my first of 
two arguments that the reverse-contractarian account of how it is rational that those 
emerging from forms of tyranny would analyse the utility of State apparatus along the 
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lines of it being a service provider and as such, any decision-making procedure used 
























µWhen citizens deliberate, they exchange views and debate their supporting 
reasons concerning public political questions. They suppose that their political 
opinions may be revised by discussion with others; and therefore these 
opinions are not simply a fixed outcome of their existing private or non-
political interests¶ ± John Rawls (1999, p. 137) 
In order to map out a vision that primarily derives its foundations from 
instrumental thinking, it would be sensible to consider the contemporary theory of 
deliberative democracy that seeks to both improve decision-making, but also maintain 
and enhance intrinsic values and popular participation. It is important to set out the 
theory in brief and explain the similarities and departures that this thesis will 
accommodate due to the manner in which the theory does potentially conflict with the 
service democracy and the division of cognitive labour that is implicit there. As will 
be seen, both theories do accept that knowledge is necessary for better quality 
decision-making, but instead of pursuing this specifically, deliberative democrats wish 
to improve the average knowledge of all, as opposed to dividing decision-making 
functions between the various knowledge bases of society.  
 
2.1 - Overview of the Theory 
 Deliberative Democracy is a field of enquiry that concerns itself with the right, 
opportunity and capacity of all to engage in collective decision-making (Dryzek & 
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Niemeyer, 2012). This relates itself to the principle that a legitimate government 
should embody the will of the people and that decision-making and laws should come 
from citizens after having engaged in deliberation (Elster, 1997, p. ix). People should 
not be seen as passive objects of legislation and governance, but active agents who 
govern society (Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, 2004, p. 3). The process of 
deliberation should involve the exercise of political autonomy of the participants and 
through public-tested reasoning, citizens should arrive at a rational consensus (or the 
judgement of a majority). As will be apparent, this approach differs from ones that 
prefer to aggregate individual preference, as opposed to trying to allow for the 
creation of convergence. It does not simply accept unchallenged individual views, but 
prefers to test those views and potentially change those views through a process of 
rationalisation and arrive at reasonable, justifiable political judgements (Held, 2006, p. 
232). This is based upon the argument that to simply consider ones individual 
circumstances is a market-orientated approach and is not appropriate for discussion 
and thinking inside the political forum where issues affect all people, not just an 
individual (Elster, 1997, p. 11). Such deliberation should be built into constitutions 
and institutions that govern societies so that it is an ongoing process, and not one that 
occurs in smaller groups at scheduled events. 
 
2.1.1  Habermas and Rawls 
The earliest writers of the deliberative tradition are John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas. They focused on the normative justifications of deliberation and achieving 
rational consensus through reasoned debate and exchange of views (Elstub, 2010, p. 
291). However, their approaches did differ slightly due to the way in which they 
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viewed and appropriated ,PPDQXHO.DQW¶VWUDQVFHQGHQWDOIRUPXODRISXELFODZ
ZKHUHKHVDLGWKDW³$OODFWLRQVWKDWUHODWHWRWKe right of other human beings are wrong 
LIWKHLUPD[LPLVLQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKSXEOLFLW\´(Kant, 1991, p. 126). In other words, 
lies, secrecy and deception are incompatible with the categorical imperative as they do 
not show respect for persons, and so governments should strive for openness and 
honesty (Scruton, 2001, pp. 126-127). This difference gave rise to Rawls-Habermas 
GHEDWHZKHUH+DEHUPDVEHOLHYHGUHFRQFLOLDWLRQIRFXVHGRQWKHµSublic use RIUHDVRQ¶
whereas for Rawls it was µreconciliation by public reason¶ (Gledhill, 2011, p. 13). 
On this point, Rawls takes a procedural view of public reason and argues that 
for a law to be considered right, it must pass a publicity test (Elstub, 2010, p. 293). His 
social contract approach to outlining this point famously does not include an actual 
discussion in ordinary conditions, but instead he would place people into the µoriginal 
position¶ and under a veil of ignorance so that private interests and biases are 
theoretically removed (Rawls, 1999, p. 118). In this state, it would be possible to 
argue rationally and truly with the public good in mind and with the purpose of 
agreeing principles of justice that would guide a society and its institutions. It is 
important that alternative conceptions of the public good are considered, but any 
bargaining on personal interests would be unjust (Cohen, 1997, p. 68). Society would 
be stable in that people would converge upon a rational account of justice. 
Rawls maintains this position even when he makes alterations to his theory of 
justice in his 1993 work Political Liberalism (Rawls, 2005). In this work, Rawls 
attempts to address the challenges relating to stability given to his theory by pluralism. 
The pluralist position would maintain that pluralism is a permanent feature of liberal 




reasoned convergence on fundamental principles (Rawls, 2005, p. 55). In response, 
Rawls tries to show that it is reasonably possible for democratic citizens to morally 
endorse a liberal conception of justice that assigns priority to basic liberties (Freeman, 
2007, p. 365). To do this he GHYHORSVWKHµRYHUODSSLQJFRQVHQVXV¶+Hre he draws a 
distinFWLRQEHWZHHQµFRPSUHKHQVLYHFRQFHSWLRQV¶RIVRFLHW\ZKLFKW\SLFDOO\ORRNDW
PRUDOTXHVWLRQVRIKRZWROLYHDQGµSROLWLFDOFRQFHSWLRQV¶ZKLFKFRQFHUQSROLWLFDO
questions). By creating a political conception of justice, as opposed to a moral one, he 
argues it is possible to have a freestanding account of justice that could be accepted by 
all, irrespective of their comprehensive moral views (Freeman, 2007, p. 366). As 
people recognise that just institutions would benefit them, they will incorporate this 
into their comprehensive moral doctrines and they will become part of the background 
culture. As such, religious, philosophical and moral conceptions of the good life will 
evolve doctrinally so as to endorse liberal political values (Freeman, 2007, p. 366). 
Stability is then achieved because all reasonable and rational citizens will recognise 
and comply with the liberal principles of justice for the comprehensive reasons that 
are specific to their own personal moral conceptions of society. Stability is not then 
simply a rational compromise of values, but an active first choice for everyone. 
 A further departure from Habermas is seen in the way that Rawls characterises 
deliberative democracy. For Rawls, the key chamber of such discussion would be the 
µSXEOLFpolitical IRUXP¶ where there are only three discourses of relevance: the 
writings of judges, the work of government officials / representatives and the work of 
political candidates (Rawls, 1999, p. 133). Any other forum would be part of the 
µEDFNJURXQGFXOWXUH¶RIFLYLOVRFLHW\ This is because, in terms of public discussion, 
the only topics of relevance are of a constitutional and political nature. Any other 
deliberations involving privately held views, like religion, form part of the separate 
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background culture. By using this distinction, Rawls attempts to reduce the political 
friction that is seen in pluralistic societies (Bantas, 2010, p. 6). It is within the public 
political forum that the citizens who comprise the various positions of state are 
H[SHFWHGWRH[HUFLVHµSXEOLFUHDVRQ¶ 7KHµLGHDRISXEOLFUHDVRQ¶WULHVWRHVWDEOLVKD
commonality between citizens who hold different comprehensive moral views. It 
VSHFLILHV³DWWKHGHHSHVWOHYHOWKHEDVLFPRUDODQGSROLWLFDOYDOXHVWKDWDUHWRGHWHUPLQH
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHODWLRQWRLWVFLWL]HQVDQGWKHLUUHODWLRQWRRQHDQRWKHU´
(Rawls, 1999, p. 132). Those engaging in public reason use it as a source for their 
judgements of others and it replaces other doctrines of truth (such as faith) when 
engaging in public deliberation (Bantas, 2010, p. 3).  
In contrast, Habermas believed that laws must be created through public 
rational debate which then would test if such laws would pass the publicity 
requirements (Elstub, 2010, p. 294). His writings relate to a linguistic approach to the 
explanation of social order. He believed that human action is coordinated by language. 
People, if using language (or utterances) to coordinate actions, must justify those 
actions by giving good reasons (Finlayson, 2005, p. 25). Habermas refers to such 
MXVWLILFDWLRQDVµYDOLGLW\FODLPV¶and these have both moral and rational status. With 
this, speech has a pragmatic function in that it brings interlocutors to a shared 
understanding of meaning and can then create an intersubjective consensus 
(Habermas, 1981, p. 287). As speech creates shared understanding, actions can then 
ensue due to having given reason-based utterances. It is important to note that any 
speech-act must make three claims to validity: a validity claim to truth; a validity 
claim to rightness; and a validity claim to truthfulness (Finlayson, 2005, p. 35). This 
means that when a person provides justifications for actions, they are making implied 
assertions. These assertions can include having good reasons for their belief, and 
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could, if required, convince the hearer of their position. Equally for rightness, the 
interlocutor implies that there are sufficient moral reasons that could convince the 
KHDUHULISUHVHQWHG)RURQHSHUVRQWRµXQGHUVWDQG¶DQRWKHU¶VXWWHUDQFHWKHQ
Habermas feels four conditions must be present: the recognition of the literal meaning; 
the assessment by the hearer of the speaker¶s intentions; knowledge of the reasons 
which may be used to justify the utterance; and acceptance of those reasons 
(Finlayson, 2005, p. 38).  
Of course, it will not always be the case that a hearer does accept the express 
or implied justifications for action. There could very well be an unsuccessful 
FRPPXQLFDWLYHDFWLRQ7KLVWKHQWULJJHUVDµGLVFRXUVHVLWXDWLRQ¶DQGUHTXLUHVWKH
express giving of reasons. For these purposes, discourse is not simply synonymous 
with language or speech, but is a technical term for a reflective form of speech that 
aims to achieve a rational consensus (Habermas, 1981, p. 42). Any discourse should 
be governed by three levels of rules: basic rules relating to logic and semantics (like 
being consistent and non-contradictory); procedural rules relating to sincerity and 
accountability; and finally rules that immunize the discourse against coercion and 
inequality to ensure only the force of the better argument wins (Habermas, 1990, pp. 
86-89). If the hearer accepts reasons under these conditions, then consensus has been 
acquired. 
On this view, successful political deliberation would be one where the 
procedures can be considered legitimate (such as giving people equal standing) and 
they result in a rational consensus on the public good due to the removal of normative 
disagreements through the application publically acceptable reasons. Political 
preferences should be formed during the deliberative process (or general 
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communication), and not prior to it. Otherwise, respective biases of the participants 
will exist in their arguments and they are less likely to alter a pre-conceived view. 
The main task of Habermas's democratic theory is to provide a normative 
account of legitimate law. His model is found in his Between Facts and Norms (1996). 
Essentially, the argument links his discourse theory with an analysis of the demands 
inherent in modern legal systems, which Habermas understands in light of the history 
of Western modernization (Bohman, 1996, p. 7). The analysis thus begins with a 
functional explanation of the need for positive law in modern societies.  
Societies are stable in the long run if their members generally perceive them as 
being legitimate: being organized in accordance with what is considered to be true, 
right, and good. In pre-modern Europe, legitimacy was grounded in shared religious 
values that penetrated all spheres of life. As modernization brought with it pluralism 
and functional differentiation (such as autonomous market economies, scientific 
research), the potentials for misunderstanding and conflict about the what constituted 
the good increased. (Finlayson, 2005, p. 104). Moral discourse was not therefore 
sufficient to regulate conflict and maintain order in heterogeneous societies. Political 
institutions and norms forge modern social orders too. 
Sociologically, then, modern law can be understood as a functional solution to 
the potentials for conflict inherent in modernization. By opening up legally defined 
spheres of individual freedom, modern law reduces the burden of questions that 
require general (society-wide) discursive consensus. (Bohman & Rehg, 2014). Within 
these legal boundaries, individuals are free to pursue their interests. As such, modern 
law is mainly concerned with the µdefinition, protection, and reconciliation of 
individual freedoms in their various institutional and organizational contexts¶
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(Bohman & Rehg, 2014). However, such rights to freedom are expressions of freedom 
only if citizens can also see themselves as the authors of the laws that interpret their 
rights. That is, only if the laws that protect private freedom also issue from citizens' 
exercise of public autonomy as lawmakers acting through their elected 
representatives. 
The idea of public autonomy means that the legitimacy of legislation must 
ultimately be linked to processes of public discourse that influence decision-making in 
legislative branches of government. Habermas outlines this requirement in his 
GHPRFUDWLFSULQFLSOHRIOHJLWLPDF\³RQO\WKRVHVWDWXWHVPD\FODLPOHJLWLPDF\WKDWFDQ
meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn 
haVEHHQOHJDOO\FRQVWLWXWHG´(Habermas, 1996, p. 110). Decisions about laws 
typically involve a combination of validity claims: not only truth claims about the 
likely consequences of different legal options, but also claims about their moral 
rightness (or justice), claims about the authenticity of different options in light of the 
polity's shared values and history, and pragmatic claims about which option is feasible 
or more efficient (Bohman & Rehg, 2014). Legitimate laws must pass the different 
discursive tests that come with each of these validity claims. 
Despite these normative differences between Rawls and Habermas, there are 
areas of convergence. With regards to the common good, they both argue that 
universal public reasons will result in consensus (Elstub, 2010, p. 295). For Rawls, 
consensus on the procedures that will regulate society and institutions is necessary for 
them to be considered just. For Habermas, consensus is necessary for deliberation 
because without it, people would not be inclined to exchange views due to the 
perceived futility of arriving at a common direction going forward. Common ground 
is also seen when discussing the forms of communication that should be used within 
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the deliberative process. Both agree that the discourses used should be reason-based, 
meaning that tools like rhetoric are not helpful and can potentially distort the 
arguments presented and make them harder to properly be analysed in public (Elstub, 
2010, p. 297)+DEHUPDVH[SUHVVHGWKLVLQKLVµLGHDOVSHHFKVLWXDWLRQ¶ZKHUHDOO
communication should be understandable and free from coercion (Weber, 2008, p. 1). 
 
2.1.2 Recent Theory 
 The above normative justifications are important for the recent approaches, but 
are criticised for not appreciating the complexity of modern societies and certainly not 
appreciating the plurality of political positions that exist, nor how opinions can be 
deeply entrenched. This latter point questions the concept of unitary public reason and 
how, in practise, it would be almost utopian to imagine unanimous agreement (Elstub, 
2010, p. 293). Indeed, Rawls makes an attempt to explain how agreement over basic 
liberties and justice could emerge within a pluralistic society, but he still relies upon 
people putting aside things such aVUHOLJLRXVEHOLHIVZKHQWKH\HQJDJHLQµSXEOLF
UHDVRQ¶, relegating such views to the background culture (Bantas, 2010, p. 2). Instead, 
recent writers accept the various limitations to that absolute consensus and attempt to 
construct a more pragmatic approach that acknowledges and appreciates the real 
psychological workings of individuals and groups.  
Those academics do though disagree about what deliberative democracy 
exactly entails and how to define it, but a reasonably all-encompassing definition can 
be given as follows: 
µ«DIRUPRIJRYHUQPHQWLQZKLFKIUHHDQGHTXDOFLWL]HQVDQGWKHLU
representatives) justify decisions in a process in which they give one another 
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reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of 
reaching conclusions that are binding on all citizens but open to future 
challenge¶ (Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, 2004, p. 7) 
 For Gutmann and Thompson, deliberative democracy has four distinctive 
characteristics. Firstly is the requirement to give reasons. These should not be merely 
procedural nor substantive, but instead they should be reasons that are acceptable to 
persons who are free and equal and are looking for fair terms of cooperation 
(Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, 2004, p. 3). Such reason-giving both justifies a 
SHUVRQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQYHUVHO\DOORZLQJLWWREHFKDOOHQJHGE\RWKHUVDQGLVDOVRDQ
expression of respect by acknowledging the right of others to hear reasons. Secondly, 
the reasons given should be made accessible to those listening. The most important 
way of doing this is to make them public by both having discussions in the public 
sphere and by actually airing them as opposed to keeping them mentally hidden away 
(Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, 2004, p. 4). Thirdly, the process aims at actually 
producing binding decisions, as opposed to being purely educational or entertaining. 
Whilst these two experiences may very well feature, the end product and purpose of 
deliberation is to impact governmental decision making (Gutmann & Dennis 
Thompson, 2004, p. 5). Lastly, the process of deliberation should be dynamic. This 
means that even if a decision has been made, it should not mean that the debate shuts 
down. It is still possible for citizens to criticise past decisions and potentially alter 
them on the basis of new arguments (Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, 2004, p. 6). 
 Joshua Cohen, in contrast, describes five main features of deliberative 
democracy. Firstly, there is an ongoing association of members and this will continue 
indefinitely (Cohen, 1997, p. 72). Secondly, they share a commitment to coordinate 
their affairs according to norms that they arrive at through deliberation. Thirdly, 
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deliberative democracy recognises the pluralistic nature of alternative views and, 
whilst attempting to find common ground, there should be no compulsion to have to 
do so (Cohen, 1997, p. 72). Fourthly, deliberation is the source of legitimacy and so 
connections between deliberation and substantive outcomes must be clear (Cohen, 
1997, p. 73). Finally, participants acknowledge that each persons has deliberative 
capacities and the right to operate in such a deliberative environment.  
 ,QKLVFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHµLGHDOGHOLEHUDWLYHSURFHGXUH¶KHIXUWKHUH[SODLQVWKDW
deliberation can be considered µIUHH¶LISDUWLFLSDQWVDJUHHWRELQGWKHPVHOYHVWRWKH
conclusion and compliance occurs due to such conclusions being arrived at through a 
deliberative procedure (Cohen, 1997, p. 74). Deliberation can be considered 
µUHDVRQHG¶LIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWVDUHUHTXLUHGWRVWDWHWKHLUUHDVRQVIRUDFFHSWLQJ
rejecting a proposal. Finally, deliberation should promote formal and substantive 
equality. The former relates to not singling people out and allowing equal standing at 
all stages. The latter relates to not allowing differences in social standing to affect 
their ability to contribute (Cohen, 1997, p. 74) 
 These recent accounts approach deliberative democracy from a more realistic 
perspective and therefore do slightly conflict with the earlier accounts of Rawls and 
Habermas. As mentioned above, their approaches do not completely appreciate the 
sheer complexity and size of modern societies in terms of diversity of views, scale, 
socio-economic inequalities, globalisation etc (Elstub, 2010, p. 293). Recent writers 
have attempted to address these concerns and provide a more pragmatic theory. For 
Bohman, a realistic conception of deliberation must account for cultural pluralism and 
how this would impact upon the ability to arrive at a common good (Bohman, 1996, p. 
34). With this, community biases could impact upon the range of problems and 
restrictions available for discussion. Writers also assume that people are, in reality, 
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motivated by their own interests and preferences. These should be reconciled through 
the deliberative process, but probably not resolved in a complete sense (Guttman & 
Thompson, 1996, pp. 72-73). Further to this, confirmation biases can hinder the 
conciliatory approach that deliberation employs and psychological research indicates 
that people are generally less responsive to reasons that are contrary to their pre-
conceived views (Femia, 1996, pp. 378-381). It is also seen that people are more 
likely to defend already publicly stated opinions so as to avoid the embarrassment of 
making a public retraction or admitting to being wrong (Parkinson, 2006, p. 37). 
Finally, views can become solidified due to religious or ethnic backgrounds that 
would not respond to reasonable argumentation. That is not to say the religious are 
irrational or unreasonable, but certain moral values especially are not up for 
negotiation (Barber & Bartlett, 2005, p. 222).  
 In light of the above difficulties, contemporary writers are very sceptical about 
the possibility of consensus creation on the common good. As such, consensus is not 
required for legitimacy and so agreement can be reached through compromise under a 
deliberative framework. In other words, it is not necessary for all people to agree to 
the exact same line of reasoning (Guttman & Thompson, 1996, p. 93). Rather, a 
common direction forward can be achieved based upon a plurality of reasons. Such a 
decision can be made through majority-rule voting as this a realistic way to decide. 
The process can maintain its legitimacy is if can ensure a greater dissemination of 
relevant knowledge and information (Elstub, 2010, p. 296). Further scepticism comes 
from the restrictions placed upon the types of communication available to participants. 
The earlier writers believed that only reason would be justified, but the recent thinkers 
feel that this could actually substantively limit the deliberative process to dominant 
social groups who are better versed in such thinking and communication (Elstub, 
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2006, p. 31). They therefore accept the usage of other communicative forms like 
rhetoric, storytelling and humour (Bohman, 1996, p. 116), but do recognise that 
reason has to be the prime form. 
 
2.2 - Analysis and Criticism 
 On the whole, the aims of deliberative democracy do seem noble. The earlier 
approaches relating to communicative rationality and achieving a rational consensus 
through publically discussed views do seem philosophically and logically appealing. 
Indeed, in a world where either all humans had extremely similar characteristics and 
backgrounds, or under a veil of ignorance, then one could hope that rationality alone 
could draw out conclusions that were so concrete and irrefutable that unanimous 
agreement could result. However, a criticism of the Habermasian approach would be 
that the members of a society, simply by virtue of understanding what one another 
mean, will not necessarily then adhere to the same social and moral rules (Finlayson, 
2005, p. 39). Rawls too can be criticised for the way he relegates many important 
values that people hold to the background culture, and the way he argues for 
deliberation to take place only between those comprising the pubic political forums. 
As recognised by the contemporary writers, these normative approaches do not fare 
well in reality and so this brings into question its utility. The contemporary writers do 
a good job of exposing the practical issues that dog the normative theory and open it 
up to serious question. As stated at the start, deliberation is tasked with both 
respecting intrinsic and instrumental aims. With regards to the latter, it does seek to 
improve decision-making, and does recognise that knowledge is important for this 
task. The question for consideration is how well it actually does this and how well it 
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could achieve this on the mass scale required for it to comply with the intrinsic aims 
of involving everyone in the process and discussions. 
 Part of this relates to social epistemology and to the psychology of participants 
in deliberation and the various cognitive biases that can operate upon the minds of 
WKRVHWDVNHGZLWKFRPLQJWRDGHFLVLRQ,QGHHGLWLVQRWFOHDULIµZLVHU¶MXGJHPHQWVGR
result from this process (Sunstein, 2011, p. 314). For instance, there can be the 
creation of a consensus of falsehood that amplifies errors instead of correcting them. 
There can be both informational and social influences that cause people to either fail 
to disclose private information in the face of publicly stated information, or fail to 
disclose information due to fear of disapproval from more dominant members of the 
group (Sunstein, 2011, p. 315). In turn, this can reduce the variance of views 
expressed as members are more inclined to come into accord with one another, as 
opposed to place a full range of views on the table (Brown, 1986, p. 206). By having 
such convergence on views, it is found that deliberating groups are more likely to be 
highly confident of their conclusions, whether in fact they are right or wrong 
(Sunstein, 2011, p. 316). This is no problem particularly if they do come to a sensible 
conclusion, but very dangerous if they come to a less than sensible one. Linked to this 
is the problem of group polarisation where like-minded people can adopt more 
extreme views post-deliberation than they started with (Brown, 1986, p. 207). This 
can be caused by people with extreme views expressing more confidence that those 
µRQWKHIHQFH¶DQGZKHUHWKHVDPHRUVLPLODUYLHZJHWVPHQWLRQHGPXOWLSOHWLPHVLW
can make others who are unsure come round to that view. 
 Even where groups do have specialist members, where answers are definite, 
deliberating groups do not magically become as good as their specialists, but instead 
do little better than the average individual member would have done (Gigone & 
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Hastie, 1997, p. 161). As such, the actual information held by members is less 
effective than would be hoped and deliberating groups tend to poorly aggregate the 
information they hold. Indeed, many decisions on public matters are not definitive 
answers. Many decisions are ultimately taken based upon probability. However, a 
QXPEHURIFRJQLWLYHELDVHVDQGKHXULVWLFVFDQQHJDWLYHO\LPSDFWDSHUVRQ¶VDQG
JURXS¶VDELOLW\WRDVVHVVSUREDELOLW\7KHµUHSUHVHQWDWLYHQHVVKHXULVWLF¶H[SODLQVWKDW
people assess probability based upon resemblance to other events of a similar nature, 
RU³EHFDXVH$ORRNVOLNH%$ZLOOEHKDYHOLNH%´(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, p. 3). 
A siPLODULVVXHVFRPHVIURPWKHµDYDLODELOLW\KHXULVWLF¶ZKHUHSHRSOHDVVHVV
probability based upon examples that spring to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, p. 
4). Therefore when assessing the chances of a terrorist attack, they will scan their 
minds to think of such events in the past. The more people who can think of incidents, 
the higher probability the group gives to it happening again, irrespective of the true 
likelihood. With these heuristics operating upon the minds of most deliberators, there 
is no evidence that groups avoid the errors of individuals and so make better 
decisions.  
)URPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIWKLVWKHVLVWKHUHFHUWDLQO\LVQ¶WDQ\HYLGHQFHWKDW
groups of lay people can become expert in any sense by applying a deliberative 
process to decision-making. It is clear that deliberative democracy struggles to even 
draw out the knowledge that participants have, making true deliberative discussion of 
all of the relevant views and interest difficult. It can fall into dangerous traps where 
groups can confidently come to erroneous or poorly judged decisions. To suggest that 
GHOLEHUDWLRQZHHGVRXWSRRUDSSURDFKHVLQIDYRXURIJRRGRQHVGRHVQ¶WVHHPWRFRPH
to fruition. All-in-all, it does not make a convincing argument that the instrumental 
aims of consistently making better decisions will occur.  
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 Further practical criticism can come from the nature of attempting to 
µVFDOH-XS¶WKHUDWKHUVPDOOHUVFDOHDWWHPSWVRIFLWL]HQMXULHVDQGGHOLEHUDWLYHSROOV
Dryzek and Neimeyer admit that one of the challenges that deliberative democracy 
faces is applying deliberative features to politics more widely (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 
2012). This does raise questions about feasibility at the larger, national scale. Firstly, 
the same intensity of people meeting face-to-face would presumably not occur at the 
wider-level. It would be very unrealistic to assume that on multiple issues, millions of 
people could be directly engaged with in argument and true reflection that deliberation 
requires. Of more concern for this thesis is that information alters and changes. A 
person could attend some form of deliberation group and feel knowledgeable, yet just 
a few years down the line new information may emerge that could alter the landscape. 
Therefore re-education and re-deliberation would be needed, otherwise people will be 
confident in the knowledge they have, which is now out-dated. In the event that a 
more Rawlsian approach is desired in that only political officials, candidates, judges 
etc can deliberate, this would leave open a number of criticisms. Firstly, this could 
create a monopolisation of power that then could result in corruption and lack of 
accountability (Young, 1999, p. 174). Secondly, to prevent citizens from participating 
would mean that they would not benefit from the deliberative process and so any votes 
they periodically cast at election times could be less informed. Thirdly, to so distinctly 
split the political forums from the background culture means that citizens may come 
to question their role in society, and this could create issues with the recognition of 
state authority (Sandel, 1996). As a result, citizen obligations could become too weak 
to sustain the communal obligations required for a modern state to sustain itself. 
Finally, from the perspective of this thesis, the restriction of day-to-day political and 
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constitutional matters to a select group does not allow for the potential contributions 
that each citizen could make, dependent upon their knowledge in specific areas.  
The micro and macro strategies of recent writers do attempt to tackle the issues 
of scale. However, the micro strategies of citizens juries and deliberative polls fall 
foul of the very limited success as shown within social epistemology, and the macro 
VWUDWHJLHVUHO\KHDYLO\XSRQPHGLDDQGWKHSUHVVZKLFK3DUNLQVRQDGPLWVLVµIODZHG¶
and geared more towards entertainment than true substantive analysis that is required 
for decision-making (Parkinson, 2006, p. 102).  
From an intrinsic perspective, it is not clear that emphasising the educative and 
general developmental aspects that a participant may receive gives much value. Jon 
Elster very much criticises views like this on the ground that they are incoherent, self-
defeating and focus on personal development at the expense of community 
development (Elster, 1997, p. 19). For him, such educative outcomes are simply by-
products of instrumentality, as opposed to being the thing strived for. This is because 
if the purpose argued for is educational, as opposed to making good decisions, then 
the system will not produce those educational outcomes because there would be no 
motivation to educate. There has to be a point to the education, which would be to 
produce better decisions. Deliberative democracy does comply with this in that it 
recognises that knowledge is necessary for good decisions. However, it needs to 
ensurHWKDWLWGRHVQ¶WLQH[DQWHDUJXPHQWVFRXFKE\-products as actual aims. To 
assess institutional arrangements once they are set up and operate is acceptable as this 
is an assessment of by-products ex post (Elster, 1997, p. 20). This is an important 
distinction that deliberative democrats could easily fall foul of. From the perspective 
of this thesis, the service democracy would not be promoting intrinsic values above 
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and beyond instrumental ones. They would welcome by-products of good decision 
making and the promotion of knowledge specialism. 
Part of the importance of deliberation is that there are procedures in place that 
govern the process and ensure fair discussion and the promotion of sharing ideas. 
However, in striving to overcome some of the psychological flaws listed above, any 
such procedures would need to be dominating and imposing. This then raises the risk 
of debate being regulated DQGQRWIUHHEXWDOVRLWULVNVFUHDWLQJDµSULVRQ¶IURPZKLFK
it would be difficult to break, even if rational to do so (Elster, 1997, p. 19). Joshua 
Cohen outlines an argument that such procedure could limit freedom of expression 
(Cohen, 1997, pp. 82-83). As the form of the procedure would depend upon what a 
majority decides, it therefore places basic liberties into the hands of that majority, as 
RSSRVHGWRUHVSHFWLQJLWDVDQLQDOLHQDEOHULJKW+RZHYHUDQ\NLQGRIµH[SUHVVLRQ¶LV
technically information that could be valuable, meaning deliberation should allow for 
it (Cohen, 1997, p. 83). Cohen responds to this by arguing that people would have 
complete freedom to express themselves in the deliberations prior to forming the 
procedures. This could then raise an ad infinitum objection in that if deliberation 
requires procedures to regulate itself, what governs the deliberations that discuss the 
forming of the procedures?  
 
Conclusion 
 Deliberative democracy is rightly of great interest to many academics due to 
its attempts to improve collective decision making, and with that, maintain and 
enhance intrinsic values of participation and education. Certainly, its aims of 
improving knowledge generally is of particular interest here. There would be 
54 
 
agreement that this is an important aspect of better decision-making. Where there is 
departure, however, is in how far this is taken. This thesis is arguing that knowledge is 
paramount for good decision-making and that when taking decisions that affect 
everyone, knowledge is an integral requirement. There does not appear to be much 
evidence that deliberation of lay people, even with experts guiding them, produces 
consistently better outcomes. This process, at best, marginally improves an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶s knowledge, but by no means turns participants or groups into experts. 
Therefore the aim of increasing knowledge through rational discussion as a means of 
improving decision-PDNLQJLVQ¶WSDUWLFXODUO\PHW,WLVKHOGEDFNE\LWVLQVLVWHQFHWKDW
every single person has the right to contribute on every single issue, irrespective of 
how much or little they know, and irrespective of how this could impact on decision 
outcomes. Even where deliberation takes place only among political decision-makers 
themselves, this then raises questions about the validity of the laws produced, whilst 
VWLOOFODLPLQJWREHDµGHPRFUDWLFSURFHVV¶It recognises that more knowledge is 
EHWWHUEXWLVQ¶WSUHSDUHGWRWDNHWKHQH[WVWHSRIWUXO\SXUVXLQJWKDWLGHDOIndeed it can 
be questioned what knowledge threshold is required before we can say that citizens do 
have adequate knowledge for the purposes of deliberating and producing better 
outcomes. Who sets this threshold? How much information should the average citizen 
hold before we can say that the aims of deliberative democracy have been met and 










µThere is not one who, in any matter which concerns himself, would not rather 
have his affairs managed by a person of greater knowledge and intelligence, 
than by one of less¶ ± John Stuart Mill (2009, p. 21) 
 
Ignorance, or the state of lacking knowledge (HarperCollins Publishers, 2009) 
is a label that can be ascribed to everyone. In a world of increasing technicality and 
specialisation, to know everything is only the preserve of Gods. In simpler times, 
polymaths of old may have claimed such wide-reaching knowledge, but this is not 
realistic today. With this in mind, can democracy function through the giving of equal 
participation on matters of State, despite actual knowledge being confined to limited 
areas within each person? The chapter will consider this most vital component of the 
thesis; the concern with knowledge imbalances, and how democracy, as presently 
conceived, does not account for them. It will consider the views of some more famous 
critics of either democracy itself, or of the capacity of people to engage collectively in 
an open democracy. These contributions are important because they help in the 
analysis of democracy as a decision-making procedure and provide a rarer insight into 
the flaws of this procedure. However, such contributions can oversimplify the 
concerns of ignorance and tend to provide more extreme views that can be more easily 
rebutted (See Democracy and Its Critics (Dahl, 1989), Chapter 5 ± A Critique of 
Guardianship). A better account of the concerns of knowledge distribution will be 
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given that both acknowledges that people are ignorant in many areas, but are 
knowledgeable in others. Tailoring democracy to allow people to be involved in the 
areas they know about will be seen as a better way forward. This chapter will see me 
outline three theories of guardianship and then analysis and criticise them using my 
observation of topic-specific ignorant majorities. 
 
3.1 ± Plato 
Chronologically speaking, one of the earlier recorded criticisms of democracy 
is found within the works of Athenian philosopher Plato. He, like his teacher Socrates, 
had great misgivings about the capacity of the people to make rational decisions on 
the running of the Athenian state, and that with time, democracy would collapse into 
tyranny (Held, 2006, p. 25) This in part was due to liberty and political equality 
leading to the indulgence of desires, which in turn would lead to disrespect for 
political and moral authority (Plato, 2007, p. 299). As a result, conflict would emerge 
between sectional interests who are all wanting the fulfilment of their desires, 
meaning consideration of the common good is replaced with consideration of the self 
(Held, 2006, p. 25).  
 Another aspect to the failure of democracy was the capacity of ordinary people 
to comprehend the common good and that democracy comprises the rule of the 
foolish, vicious and brutal (Dunn, 2005, p. 45). The majority are not best placed to 
rule over the collective due to their inability to truly see reality and to truly break free 
of the physical. This of course links with his Theory of the Forms and his allegory of 
the cave, where the perceived physical world was simply a shadow of its perfect self 
(Plato, 2007, p. 240). It was the philosophers, through using thought and ideas, who 
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could truly see reality and see the perfect forms of the imperfect physical world. In 
relation to democracy and society, the Theory of the Forms applied itself to both the 
FRQVWLWXWLRQRIDVRFLHW\DQGDSHUVRQ¶VVRXO,QERWKFDVHVRUGHULVHVWDEOLVKHGZKHUH
reason governs indignations (desires to act upon negative impulses) and appetites 
(desires to act upon pleasurable impulses), as they are subordinate (Plato, 2007, p. 
xxiv).  In the event that a person was not capable of reasoning internally, which meant 
most ordinary people, they then must listen externally to those within which reason 
does rule (Plato, 2007, p. xxvi). This highlights how Plato was primarily concerned 
ZLWKDUULYLQJDWµFRUrHFW¶MXGJHPHQWVZKHUHUHDVRQ should prevail (Sharples, 1994, p. 
5). It is important to note that Plato may not have been against democracy per se. If it 
could demonstrate the ability to arrive at soundly based views, then it is possible he 
may have accepted it in some form (Sharples, 1994, p. 6). However, based upon his 
analysis of ancient Athens, he believed that it could not demonstrate the necessary 
competence to satisfy him.  
To highlight his case against popular ignorance, Plato used two allegories: the 
ship of state (Plato, 2007, p. 210) and the keeper of a large and powerful animal 
(Plato, 2007, p. 215). In the former, Plato outlines a ship that has a Captain who is 
stronger than each member of the crew, but a bit deaf and short-sighed. He, however, 
is qualified in navigation. The crew, however, do not see him as being fit to captain 
the ship and so each member attempts to take control of the vessel. However, the crew 
are not skilled in the art of navigation, which comprises of studying the seasons, the 
sky, the stars, the winds and other aspects necessary to navigate a ship. The crew 
reserve praise for anyone who is able to control the Captain by force or fraud, and 
subsequently admire their purported skills as a seaman, even though the true navigator 
is the Captain himself. With this allegory, Plato argues that the Captain (like the 
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philosopher) is undervalued as their true abilities go unrecognised. It is the Captain 
who does in fact have the strongest claim to legitimately rule (Held, 2006, p. 24). The 
FUHZOLNHGHPRFUDWLFFLWL]HQVDFWXSRQµLPSXOVHVHQWLPHQWDQGSUHMXGLFH¶(Held, 
2006, p. 24). They have no claims to expertise themselves, and any leaders chosen 
will rely upon populism to sustain their own positions and try to enact policy that 
caters to the previously mentioned selfish desires of voters. This means, in essence, 
that the blind lead the blind as non-expert voters influence the policies enacted by 
non-expert politicians. To further highlight this point, in Gorgias Plato draws a 
distinction been how a cook views food and how a doctor views food (Plato, 1998, p. 
45). The cook aims to bring pleasure to the customers who will eat his food, yet the 
doctor is concerned with the health benefits of the food that is consumed. Therefore 
the cook is like the politician who aims to obtain votes by fulfilling desires, yet the 
doctor is like the philosopher who considers only what ideas would best benefit the 
health of the society. It is the marginalised philosophers who can truly claim 
legitimacy and that legitimacy stems from knowledge of the art of statecraft and the 
science of governance. 7KHDUWRIµSROLWLFV¶OLNHQDYLJDWLRQDQGPHGLFLQHZDV
considered to be objectively discernable through thought and rationality. It is the 
SKLORVRSKHU¶VULJRURXVO\DFTXLUHGNQRwledge that justifies their suitability for power 
(Held, 2006, p. 26). Only the Philosopher-kings were capable of transcending 
sectional interests and consider the common good.  
In his second allegory, Plato argues that public opinion is not a personification 
RIµZLVGRP¶DVWKHVRSKLVWVZRXOGDUJXHEXWLQVWHDGLWZRXOGOHDGVRFLHW\DQG
leaders down a negative path of listening to desire, as opposed to what is objectively 
right or wrong (Plato, 2007, p. 215). He illustrates this with a discussion on how the 
keeper of a large and powerful animal PD\VWXG\WKHDQLPDO¶VEHKDYLRXUVDQGZDQWV
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He may come to know of what noises it likes, what food it wishes to eat and when it 
likes to sleep. However, he would not really know which of these behaviours was 
truly good or bad, desirable or undesirable. He may believe that he knows (in that 
WKLQJVWKHDQLPDOOLNHGDUHJRRGDQGWKLQJVLWGRHVQ¶WOLNHDUHEDGEXWWKLVLVDUDWKHU
utilitarian account of morality, which does not allow for objectivity. As such, any 
politician who studies public opinion to decipher what policies to put forward will err 
in thinking that public opinion can uncover good and bad. The philosopher, however, 
would be see beyond this and be able to use reasoned argument to avoid the pitfalls of 
rhetoric and majority opinion (Sharples, 1994, p. 2). 
                
3.2 ± John Stuart Mill 
A more surprising contributor to this discussion on popular ignorance is John 
Stuart Mill. He is of course famous for his contributions to liberal democracy and the 
defence of individual liberty, as seen in his book On Liberty (Mill, 2005). With this, 
participation in public affairs was a vital way for people to protect their interests and 
in doing so, enhance their political and moral knowledge. Politics was therefore a 
mechanism of moral development of the individual (Dunn, 1979, p. 52). His position 
was grounded upon his fear of an overly powerful state apparatus that could begin to 
infringe upon the liberties of individuals as it attempted to control society (Held, 2006, 
p. 81). In Considerations on Representative Government (Mill, 2008), he argued that 
for anyone to be denied the ability to have a voice over the direction of their life 
would have had their human dignity violated (Held, 2006, p. 82). This would certainly 
be the case where absolute power is wielded by a State, meaning the ability to 
SDUWLFLSDWHDQGGHIHQGRQH¶VULJKWVLVUHGXFed (Mill, 2008, p. 38). 
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However, despite the sentiments expressed above, Mill did express 
reservations about the ability of ordinary people to take political decisions. He aimed 
criticism at the unfeasibility of direct democracy on the grounds that the wisest could 
be drowned out by unwise majority (Held, 2006, p. 85), and was not any more 
optimistic about the operation of unchecked representative democracy. Despite being 
a proponent of universal suffrage, he feared that the masses could infect the political 
system with ignorance (Mill, 2008, p. 157). +HIHDUHGWKDWWKHµRSHUDWLYHFODVVHV¶
would dominate political opinion and that minority groups would go unrepresented 
and unheard.  
His response to such majority tyranny was to design a system of plural voting 
that would enhance the representation of the educated minority (Beilhante & Rocha, 
2013, p. 54). The main outline of this system came in his 1859 work Thoughts on 
Parliamentary Reform (Mill, 2009), where he advocated the weighting of the number 
of votes an elector had depending upon their level of education. Controversially still, 
Mill also proposed that those who failed basic literacy and numeracy tests should not 
be given the vote at all (Mill, 2009, p. 24), a view he had previously mentioned in 
Rationale of Representation (Mill, 1977, p. 30). He felt that all should have a choice 
in who runs the country, but that not everyone should have an equal say (Beilhante & 
Rocha, 2013, p. 55). He said that: 
µ7KHSHUIHFWLRQWKHQRIDQHOHFWRUDOV\VWHPZRXOGEHWKDW every person 
would have one vote, but that the very well educated person in the community 
should have more than one, on a scale corresponding as far as is practicable to 
WKHLUDPRXQWRIHGXFDWLRQ¶ (Mill, 2009, p. 21). 
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This was because political decision -making inherently meant an exercise of power 
over others, and so the educated and knowledgeable should be the ones trusted with 
this task (Mill, 2009, p. 25). In keeping with his earlier writings, he felt that this would 
promote participation, and this in turn would improve the popular mind both morally 
and intellectually. A further advantage would be to create more competent 
government.  
In terms of the practicalities of his plural voting system, he argued that the 
ZHLJKWRIDSHUVRQ¶VYRWHVKRXOGEHFRPPHQVXUDWHZLWKWKHLUOHYHORIHGXFDtion: 
µIf every ordinary unskilled labourer had one vote, a skilled labourer, whose 
occupation requires an exercised mind and a knowledge of some of the laws of 
external nature, ought to have two. A foreman, or superintendent of labour, 
whose occupation requires something more of general culture, and some moral 
as well as intellectual qualities, should perhaps have three. A farmer, 
manufacturer, or trader, who requires a still larger range of ideas and 
knowledge, and the power of guiding and attending to a great number of 
various operations at once, should have three or four. A member of any 
profession requiring a long, accurate, and systematic mental cultivation,²a 
lawyer, a physician or surgeon, a clergyman of any denomination, a literary 
man, an artist, a public functionary (or, at all events, a member of every 
intellectual profession at the threshold of which there is a satisfactory 
examination test) ought to have five or six. A graduate of any university, or a 
person freely elected a member of any learned society, is entitled to at least as 
PDQ\¶ (Mill, 2009, p. 20).  
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This clearly linked voting power with education, and certainly implied that the 
ordinary uneducated person had a low capacity to comprehend political matters 
(Beilhante & Rocha, 2013, p. 55). +HVDLGWKDWWKHXQHGXFDWHGZHUHµHDJHUWRFOXWFKDW
ZKDWRWKHUVKDYHDQGWKH\KDYHQRW¶DQGwHUHµLQFDSDEOHRIFOHDUO\FRQFHLYLQJWKH
ULJKWVRIRWKHUV¶(Mill, 2009, p. 24). It was this popular ignorance that his new voting 
system was designed to combat by balancing the number of voters without an 
education and the ones with one. He even went as far as saying that this system would 
be more democratic as it was otherwise possible that the ideas and contributions of the 
educated could be overshadowed and outvoted (Mill, 2009, p. 25). Plural voting 
should then promote the wellbeing of society by having the competent in charge and 
more input from the educated (which hints at his utilitarian line of thought). It could 
allow representative democracy to combine accountability with professionalism and 
expertise (Held, 2006, p. 87) 
 For the extremely uneducated, he proposed that they should have to pass a 
basic educational test to determine even their basic competence to cast a vote (Mill, 
2009, pp. 23-24)7KLVZRXOGPHDQEHLQJµUHTXLUHGWRFRS\DVHQWHQFHRI(Qglish in 
the presence of the registering officer, and to perform a common sum in the rule of 
WKUHH¶(Mill, 2009, p. 24). Rather bizarrely, he makes the suggestion that had the 
French implemented this requirement, the nation would not have had the disastrous 
Louis Napoleon Bonaparte as their President. +LVDUJXPHQWKHUHZDVQ¶WVLPSO\WKDW
being unable to read or do arithmetic meant you had a low IQ, but rather it meant that 
a person could not keep up-to-date with current affairs as divulged in newspapers and 
literature (Mill, 1977, p. 30). Allowing such people, who had a very small 
understanding of political matters, to vote appeared dangerous and allowing them 
power over others was plain wrong (Beilhante & Rocha, 2013, p. 61).                                                                                                                                  
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3.3 ± Competitive Elitism 
 A further, more comprehensive account of purported shortcomings of the 
masses comes from elite theory, or competitive elitism. This theory is an attempted 
restatement of the more classical accounts of democracy that require an active and 
informed citizenry who are represented in decision-making (Walker, 1966, p. 285). 
Such participation is necessary for the democratic system to be stable as it is 
traditionally assumed that broad agreement between the politically active is how 
decisions can be made (Walker, 1966, p. 286). In the event that political leaders 
veered from the views of the politically active, they would face reprisal at the ballot 
box. Furthermore, democracy is judged also on the intrinsic values of participation 
whereby it would give citizens an increased understanding and awareness of social 
responsibility and therefore aid in human development. Importantly, each individual¶s 
judgement on the general direction of policy is afforded equal consideration and 
weight with all others (Bachrach, 1969, p. 3). However, for elite theorists, these 
accounts are not realistic as they offer a utopian view of human nature and an 
inadequate account of the true operation of society. In its place, they attempt to restate 
the more utopian normative values of democracy and replace it with a realistic 
proceduralistic account of how decision-making occurs and aims to describe the real 
machinery of how the system operates (Hartz, 1960, p. 26). For writers like Joseph 
Schumpeter, the desire was to create an empirically based model of democracy (Held, 
2006, p. 141). Part of this is to argue that stability comes not from mass participation, 
EXWIURPWKHGLUHFWRSSRVLWH6WDELOLW\µGHSHQGVXSRQWKHDELOLW\RIWKHJLIWHGWR
command the deference of the many for the well-EHLQJRIDOO¶ (Bachrach, 1969, p. 2) 
 Joseph Schumpeter gave a succinct overview of elite theory when he wrote 
that elitism is: µWKDWLQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWIRUDUULYLQJDWSROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQVLQ
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which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for 
WKHSHRSOH¶VYRWH¶ (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 269). It therefore provides a procedural 
account of democracy that sees it squarely as being a method of decision making that 
enhances efficiency of the policy process and stability of society (Walker, 1966, p. 
286). Indeed, Walker goes on to state at page 293 that elitist theorists are concerned 
primarily with three things: the maintenance of stability in the political system, the 
preservation of existing democratic procedures and finally the preservation of the 
machinery for efficient administration of the state. 
 At its core are two assumptions about the average citizen: firstly that the 
masses are inherently incompetent, and secondly that they are at best easily 
influenced, or at worst unruly creatures that show distain towards culture and liberty 
(Bachrach, 1969, p. 2). As such, they must rely upon the wisdom of the political elite. 
As will be noted, this is normatively similar to Plato where he argues that those 
without the capacity to see true reality should allow themselves to be guided by those 
(the philosopher-kings) who can. What this then does is create two intellectual classes 
in society: the political entrepreneur (or the elite) who are well-educated and able to 
keep abreast of matters of government, and the citizens at large who are deemed to 
have little knowledge and interest in public affairs (Dahl, 1974, pp. 225-227). If Max 
Weber is considered, he characterises the political entrepreneur as being skilled in the 
art of persuasion and coalition building. They are passionate, have a sense of 
responsibility and can act in accordance with proportionality (Weber, 1946, p. 115). 
The citizens at large are characterised as being primarily concerned with their private 
lives, such as their jobs and families, and so politics is of marginal concern to them. 
He generally has a low estimation of the bulk of the electorate whose primary 
analytical tool of policy is emotion (Held, 2006, p. 135). He believes that they are 
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incapable of rationally choosing between competing policy positions, and so their only 
real use is selecting possible leaders. For Schumpeter, he too had a very low 
estimation of the political and intellectual capacities of the average citizen 
(Schumpeter, 1942, pp. 256-264). He felt that they were generally weak, operated 
upon emotional impulses and were easily influenced by illogical arguments 
(Schumpeter, 1942, p. 257). This was also coupled with the concern that most 
domestic and foreign policy was very remote from peopOH¶VOLYHVDQGVRWKH\ODFNHGD
sense of reality. (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 262). Such an apathetic common man arises 
due to a number of reasons, namely feelings of personal inadequacy, lack of interest in 
the issues, institutional weaknesses, suppression of opposition within the political 
system, or even the role of mass media in managing perceptions (Walker, 1966, p. 
290). For Weber, the increasing rationalisation and bureaucracy meant that ordinary 
people had little opportunity to be involved with the policy process (Weber, 1946, p. 
113)  
The theories of Plato and Mill would see such an apathetic, passive view of 
ordinary people as concerning and something to be addressed. However, as mentioned 
above, this apathy is seen by elite theory to be a positive thing for stability because it 
ensures that political disagreements only take place during campaigns and elections, 
as opposed to involving demonstrations, riots and even civil war (Walker, 1966, p. 
289). This system then supresses and controls internal conflict, which allows for 
stability even if there lacks a wider consensus. Stable democracy, for them, would 
come simply from agreement between the elites, and not between all those who are 
politically active at large (Key, 1961, p. 558). For Weber, democracy essentially 
becomes a testing ground to weed out the weaker leaders and allow the strong to show 
their potential (Weber, 1946, p. 113) If the uninformed masses were to participate, 
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systemic self-restraint would break down and the competition between elites would 
then be impossible. Seymour Lipset went further and argued that only the elites could 
SURWHFWIUHHGRPDQGOLEHUW\EHFDXVHUHVHDUFKVKRZHGWKDWWKHµORZHUVWUDWD¶RIVRFLHW\
were more prone to authoritarian values (Lipset, 1960, p. 101). 
 In spite of this desire for minimal mass involvement, there is a recognition of 
the indirect input that the citizens at large have over policy. Due to this being a 
competition between elites, there needs to be some responsiveness to public opinion in 
order to win the periodical elections that take place (Dahl, 1974, p. 164). The political 
entrepreneurs are in a constant battle and are regularly challenged by rivals for the 
affection of the masses. For Schumpeter, democracy then allows for the registration of 
the broad desires of the public, while leaving the actual public policy making to the 
few who are sufficiently experienced and qualified to make it. Due to this rivalry, the 
citizens at large receive conflicting messages from these alternate sources which, on 
the one hand, makes the manufacture of consent difficult (Lipset, 1962, p. 33), but on 
WKHRWKHUKDQGLWGRHVQ¶WSDUWLFXODUO\DLGLQWKHLUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISROLWLFDODIIDLUV
when then come to vote.  
 
3.4 - Ignorant Majorities and Knowledge Bases 
What all of the above accounts of the common person have in common is their 
purported observation that the average voter is quite ignorant of matters of state and 
policy. They paint a picture of individuals who are unintelligent and incapable of 
considering and analysing various issues that occur in local and national life. With 
this, there appears to be a risk of not just a tyrannical majority, but an ignorant 
majority. They fear that the masses could use their numerical advantage to demand 
67 
 
policies that are irrational and unworkable.  However, this thesis will argue that such a 
view of the common person is inaccurate and wrongly writes off the potential political 
contributions of most, if not all citizens. 
It is indeed the case that an important intrinsic argument for democracy is the 
manner in which it treats all citizens equally. This is not simply equal treatment of all 
being subjected the law (such as valuing the rule of law), but DOORZLQJµHDFK
individual¶s judgement on the general direction and character of political policies to 
EHJLYHQHTXDOZHLJKWZLWKDOORWKHUV¶(Bachrach, 1969, p. 3). Democracy should not 
impose a hierarchical ordering of citizens as this does not lead to the greatest 
utilization of the capabilities of individuals. In my view, what this does, however, is 
ignore the knowledge imbalances that exist with respect to each policy area. As said in 
the introduction to this chapter, the world is becoming increasingly technical and 
specialised (which is of course a natural progression of the division of labour) and this 
makes the ability to know a policy area in any great detail quite time consuming and 
difficult. Yet democracy gives no account of this and allows any authorised citizen the 
opportunity to vote and have their view considered, irrespective of the technical 
contribution it makes to the debate. 
This becomes particularly important when politicians consider and react to 
public opinion when forming their manifestos and when introducing legislation during 
their term of office. As Plato outlined, political leaders may be inclined to rely upon 
populist policies to maintain their own positions of power. By relying upon the 
thoughts of the public, the politician does not perform an analysis of why they think 
what they do and if such views are based upon rational enquiry and evidence, but 
rather enacts what is most politically beneficial at the time. Opinion polls then become 
of paramount importance. This may be a satisfactory state of affairs in that the 
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Figure 1: The Knowledge Wheel 
politicians are responding to public desires and this is what representative democracy 
is all about. However, a previously mentioned, non-expert politicians respond to the 
thoughts of a majority non-expert public. 
 
3.4.1  Ignorant Majorities 
'HVSLWHWKLVWRGLVPLVVWKHµFRPPRQPDQ¶LVTXLWHXQQHFHVVDU\DQGLWZRXOG
not reflect the potential contribution that each person can offer. To dismiss them in a 
complete way as Plato does, or in a partial way as Mill and the elitist theorists do, 
leads to more extreme theories that can face easier rebuttal and logical attack. It is at 
this point I must make a departure from the theorists set out previously and give an 
account of how I believe democracy should be viewed from an epistemic perspective.  
Each person, by virtue of 
their education and 
profession, operate under 
knowledge imbalances. 
Knowledge imbalances 
imply that an individual 
has specialist knowledge 
over few areas of policy, 
but not particularly over 
many others. For instance, 
a builder working in the 
construction industry may have a working professional knowledge of house building, 
the construction industry generally and more broadly the micro-economics of 
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business. However, they could not claim to have a professional or specialist 
knowledge of defence matters, or energy policy. As this applies to each person within 
society, what is created is noWVLPSO\DWZRWLHUV\VWHPRIWKHµHOLWH¶DQGWKHµFLWL]HQV
DWODUJH¶EXWDPRUHFRPSOH[V\VWHPRIUHYROYLQJLJQRUDQWPDMRUities and 
knowledgeable minorities. In other words, who falls into the ignorant majority or 
knowledgeable minority categories revolves and alters depending on the specific issue 
and person. Figure 1 above gives a pictorial view of this observation. Each citizen 
possesses both topic-specific knowledge (placing them in the knowledgable minority) 
and feedback knowledge (that would place them in the ignorant majority). The 
optimal government, from an epistemic view, is where power is concentrated in the 
red circle of knowledge, and ignorance is dispersed away from that.  Where a citizen 
does find themselves in the ignorant majority on a given topic, they can still play a 
more limited role as part of a feedback mechanism. Therefore the builder may very 
well fall into the category of knowledgeable minority with regards to his areas of 
professionalism RUµNQRZOHGJHEDVH¶DVLWVKDOOEHUHIHUUHGWRIURPKHUHRQLQ, yet 
would fall into the ignorant majority on other matters of policy. He could though 
provide user feedback of say the NHS, transport, or education services etc. Thus, a 
broad classification of elite and common man is too simplistic and does a great 
disservice to the genuine potential contributions of everyone. Therefore a more 
theoretically accurate dichotomy would be topic-specific in nature and would divide 
people between knowledgable minorities and ignorant majorities.  
Hélène Landemore, in her work Democratic Reason: Politics, Collective 
Intelligence and the Rule of the Many (Landemore, 2013), makes an attempt to 
UHFRJQLVHFRJQLWLYHLPEDODQFHVWKURXJKKHUZRUNRQµFRJQLWLYHGLYHUVLW\¶WKH
existence of different ways of viewing the world (Landemore, 2013, p. 5)), yet she 
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does not quite make the leap to acknowledging the pitfalls of the very diversity she 
outlines. She explains that democracy gives the greatest chance of arriving at good 
decisions because of the range of skills that people will have within a large society. 
Surely someone somewhere will have a good idea on how to tackle a problem. 
However, in reality, many people like to give views and not just those most competent 
to do so. Especially on more contentious issues like criminal justice, many people like 
to give their views on the length of sentences or prison conditions for example. Her 
recognition of cognitive diversity is helpful, but in her quest to outline the positives of 
democracy she ignores the down-side of a topic-specific ignorant majority giving their 
views and potentially having the ability to exercise power over others.  
In recognising the topic-specific plurality of ignorant majorities, it is possible 
to criticise the approaches taken by the previous theorists. In his account of the perfect 
society, Plato gives great credence to the idea that the philosopher kings would be best 
placed to wield the absolute power to govern. With this though, he places too much 
trust in their abilities and expertise. How can a narrow select group of individuals 
come to possess the necessary expertise to govern over a variety of areas of policy? It 
is certainly the case that one individual cannot possess the knowledge alone due to the 
shear amount of it and the limited time available to acquire it. Yet if we accept that 
maybe there would be a division of knowledge within the philosopher-kings, each 
specialising in policy areas, it would be sensible to then wonder why the citizenry at 
large could not also be required to specialise and then trusted to help govern. Equally, 
as soon as it is argued that specialisation would occur, it then defeats the concept of 
the philosopher king who is endowed with the ability to see true reality. Such 
VSHFLDOLVDWLRQZRXOGDGPLWWKDWWKH\LQGLYLGXDOO\GRQ¶t possess such abilities 
otherwise they would be able to work out the true reality for any given topic. In 
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summary, he does not see the potential in the very people he casts aside. Similar 
charges can be made against John Stuart Mill and his plural voting system. He places 
a value on education in that a person would need basic numeracy and literacy skills to 
YRWHEXWKHGRHVQ¶WH[SODLQZK\D&OHUJ\PDQVKRXOGJHW-6 votes. What do they 
know outside of the Church and theology to warrant such a weighting? They are as 
limited in their specialisms as would be the farmer who gets 3-4 votes, or the skilled 
labourer who gets 2. Each person has something to offer in their area of 
professionalism, yet they are not treated as such. Mill assumes that an educated 
Clergyman has the requisite intellect to think about and discuss matters of defence, 
education, criminal justice, the environment, transport, health etc. yet his actual 
education and professional life would indicate non-specialism in many of those areas 
of policy. ,QGHHGZKDWLVPRVWFRQFHUQLQJZLWK0LOO¶VZRUNKHUe is the way in which 
he appears to depart from his assertions that being denied the vote and the ability to 
exercise ones autonomy would constitute a violation of human dignity. Finally, 
similar comments can be made with regard to elitism. As with Plato, theorists here 
place great emphasis on the purported abilities of the political entrepreneur. This elite 
should be entrusted with policy creation (albeit guided by expert civil servants), 
allowing only an indirect impact for the views of the citizens at large. Again, the 
question has to be raised about the purported specialisms of those elites. As a group of 
individuals, they cannot all each possess the requisite expertise of all policy areas. 
,QGHHGLIRQHZHUHWRIROORZ:HEHU¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHSROLWLFDOHntrepreneur, their main 
skills lie in persuasion, coalition building and acting with a sense of proportion. It 
would have to be the case that each politician specialises and then this again opens the 
question as to why ordinary people cannot have their own specialisms recognised, or 
indeed why they are considered an elite at all. 
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In essence, a theory that discounts the contributions of vast swathes of society 
is ignoring the reality of what each person, operating within their knowledge base, can 
achieve and the potential they have. In contrast, a theory that overstates the abilities of 
each person to meaningfully contribute on a wide range of policy areas is also doing a 
disservice. A middle-ground, sort of third way theory would need to tailor the exercise 
of power / influence over those exercising power based upon an LQGLYLGXDO¶V 
knowledge base. ,WZRXOGEHFRUUHFWWRWKLQNWKDWWKLVLVWKHQOLPLWLQJDSHUVRQ¶VDELOLW\
to participate in the policy process. However, it would limit everyone. It would not be 
the case that power is being limited to one group of individuals in favour of another 
group, but that each person is limited in the policy creation process to the extent of 
what they know. Ultimately, whatever version of democracy a person wishes to 
support and argue for, what has just been outlined must be included. It is factually the 
case that the plurality of ignorant majorities exists and it must at least be recognised 
and then either argued away or catered to. 
 
3.4.2  The Threshold of Knowledge in a Polity 
Why is a limitation based upon knowledge important? For me, this is primarily 
due to the fact that an exercise of power in the public sphere does not just have an 
impact over the individual exercising that power, but over many other citizens. In the 
private sphere, however, a consumer engages in a more individual exercise when they 
wish to purchase a product. The consumer, themselves, decides what products they 
require and they then enter the market place to find a product that meets their needs. It 
could almost be described as a self-centred process. The consumer is thinking of 
themselves and the businesses they interact with are trying to attract them based upon 
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the selfish requirements of the consumer. Businesses are therefore mindful and react 
to consumer preferences, trends and general feedback. The knowledge required from 
the perspective of the consumer is essentially determined by the consumer themselves. 
They are solely the ones who will be affected by the decision to purchase, and so are 
completely responsible for the effects of that purchase. Whether it be a good or bad 
purchase, the level of knowledge and research the consumer does is up to them and 
the consequences only affect them. The businesses themselves play no particular role 
in assessing the quality of research the consumer does, aside from issuing their own 
forms of propaganda in favour of their own product, otherwise known as 
DGYHUWLVHPHQWV7KH\FHUWDLQO\GRQ¶WKHOSWKHFRQVXPHUSURSHUO\DVVHVVWKHPDUNHW
place and find the objectively best product. 
 However, normatively speaking, is such an individualistic approach to 
conducting affairs suitable for a polity? The argument here is that it certainly is not. 
Electors, unlike consumers, are voting upon matters that affected everyone. As such 
pluralist arguments, whilst accurately describing the present political process, cannot 
satisfactorily represent a normative position too. To think only of oneself when 
operating in this public environment completely detracts from the purpose of that 
environment: collective decision-making over common laws. Whilst it is possible that 
a voter may be irrationally thinking only of themselves when casting their vote, that 
does not detract from the fact that their votes, in culmination with other like-minded 
people, affect others too. As such, the threshold of knowledge has to be higher than 
the more objective indifference that is shown by consumers. When an individual or 
group is given the power to decide policy that will affect all others, there has to be a 
clear, demonstrable competence that they know what they are doing (in so far as 
contemporary evidence within that field allows). Due to this threshold being higher in 
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the polity, it is not enough to then overstate the abilities of everyone in making and 
having the power to influence policy. There has to be a more realistic assessment and 
a recognition of the occurrence of revolving ignorant majorities is just that. 
 
Conclusion 
The theories put formed by Plato, John Stuart Mill and the Competitive Elitists 
are of great importance, especially in the way they allow for consideration of a more 
extreme approach to democratic knowledge and ignorance. As can be seen, they do 
not give full credit to the capabilities and potential of all citizens within a polity and so 
they are not convincing. With this, the more classical accounts of democracy have an 
ability to overstate the capabilities of each citizens, primarily as they chase the 
intrinsic dreams of participatory equality and individual autonomy within a polity. A 
sensible middle-ground is required that respects the requirements of higher knowledge 
thresholds in the public sphere and respects that each person has various sufficiency 
and deficiencies in knowledge. However those who do fall into the ignorant majority 
on a specific area outside of their knowledge base still do have an important role to 
play in that area as feedback providers. The next chapter will take a theoretical look at 









The Service Democracy and the Better Decision 
 
µThus rather than supposing that the legitimacy of an outcome depends upon 
its correctness, I suggest that it derives, partly from epistemic value, even 
though it is imperfect, of the procedure than produced it¶ ± David Estlund 
(2008, p. 98) 
  
The observation of topic-specific ignorant majorities requires an epistemic 
model of democracy that acknowledges this consideration and on some level attempts 
to reconcile the tensions between equality of participation and the desire for outcomes 
in compliance with contemporary evidence. This would theoretically be resolved if all 
citizens possessed all knowledge, but in reality this is far from the case and indeed an 
impossible state of affairs. Democracy of course can take many forms, but one of the 
foundational tenants common to all is the egalitarian requirement that all people are 
given an equal standing to defend their interests and given equal decision-making 
power on all matters of public life. When votes are cast in a representative democracy, 
the public is both passing judgement and transferring sovereignty to representatives to 
act in all areas of public life and pass laws to govern aspects of private life. The model 
of democracy proposed here, the service democracy, will challenge the traditional 
participation assumptions and outline subtle alterations to reflect the knowledge 




4.1 Epistemic Proceduralism 
The service democracy is a procedural account of how a society can increase 
the probability of accurate diagnosis and workable solutions to problems it faces by 
integrating knowledgeable minorities and ignorant majority feedback mechanisms into 
policy-making processes. As such, there is no QHHGIRUGLVFXVVLRQVRIDµSURFHGXUH
independent standDUGRIFRUUHFWQHVV¶, or political truth (Landemore, 2013, p. 210) 
because of general agreement with the approach taken by David Estlund with his 
theory of epistemic proceduralism in Democratic Authority (2008). He outlines how 
traditional theories of democratic legitimacy stem from fair procedures that respect the 
equality of participation of citizens. He accepts that some form of proceduralism is 
better than standards of correctness assessed after a decision has been finalised and 
that epistemic criteria are compatible with such procedures (Estlund, 2008, p. 98). 
This is because it is possible to reject both purely procedural accounts and purely 
epistemic ones do not hold on their own. As such, a hybrid of the two is preferable 
DQGKHFDOOVWKLVµHSLVWHPLFSURFHGXUDOLVP¶Estlund defines this DVEHLQJµprocedural 
impartiality among individual¶s opinions, but with a tendency to be correct; the 
impartial application of intelligencHWRWKHPRUDOTXHVWLRQDWKDQG¶ (Estlund, 2008, p. 
107). +HIXUWKHUVD\VWKDWµDemocratic legitimacy requires that the procedure can be 
held, in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view, to be epistemically the best 
(or close to it) among those that are better than random¶ (Estlund, 2008, p. 98). For 
him, the moral challenge for an epistemic conception of political authority is to let 
truth be the guide without privileging the opinions of experts, and his argument 
satisfies this better than a purely epistemic account of correctness (Estlund, 2008, p. 
102). Equally it is not as overbearing as fair procedural accounts like Rousseau who 
felt minorities should cede to the majority view as the latter was by definition correct. 
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Epistemic proceduralism would allow a minority to reject the decision whilst 
accepting the legitimacy of the procedure used. As such, the outcome can still be 
considered legitimate, despite personal opposition to it, owing to the epistemic nature 
of the procedure being acceptable (Estlund, 2008, p. 105).  
As was clear from the definition he gives, it is not enough simply that 
procedures used have some, albeit, modest epistemic value, but that they conform to 
WKHµJHQHUDODFFHSWDELOLW\requirement¶ (Estlund, 2008, p. 40). This, he claims explains 
how experts do not have an automatic right to rule. He writes: 
µ7UXWKLVKHOGWREHQHLWKHUQHFHVVDU\QRUVXIILFLHQWIRUDGRFWULQH¶V
admissibility. The moral idea behind this principle is that no person can 
legitimately be coerced to abide by legal rules and arrangements unless 
sufficient reasons FDQEHJLYHQWKDWGRQRWYLRODWHWKDWSHUVRQ¶VUHDVRQDEOH
PRUDODQGSKLORVRSKLFDOFRQYLFWLRQVWUXHRUIDOVHULJKWRUZURQJ¶(Estlund, 
2008, p. 43). 
Therefore with western liberal democracies, consent to authority is of primacy and so 
any governmental form must be acceptable to all who live under it. As such, rule by 
experts would only occur if it was accepted by everyone, for which claims to truth 
would likely not be. However, democracy operating under epistemic procedures 
should be acceptable because of the moral authority adherence to knowledge can 
command, without minority acceptance that the decisions reached are always right.  
,I(VWOXQG¶VZRUNLVFRQVLGHUHGDORQJVLGHP\DUJXPHQWIRUJUHDWHU
instrumentality and an acceptance of knowledge imbalances, I would agree that the 
aim is not to define some concept of political truth, but to ensure an epistemic model 
of democracy that, procedurally speaking, requires problems and solutions are framed 
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within contemporary evidence as known and researched by topic-specific experts and 
professionals. In so doing, we give ourselves the best chance of arriving at outcomes 
that have properly diagnosed a problem and created a workable solution. The 
legitimacy of those decisions, and indeHGDQ\FRQFHSWRIDµJRRG¶GHFLVLRQthen 
comes from the design of the procedure more so than the actual individual assessment 
of policy outcomes. To base legitimacy on the latter would wreak havoc with political 
certainty and stability that are required for a political system to operate. It would, for 
example, be chaotic if each and every political decision could be scrutinised and 
potentially struck down due to being not fully compliant with contemporary evidence. 
The only way to balance the demands of instrumentality and political certainty would 
be to focus upon the procedure used and try to ensure decisions produced following 
that procedure are in compliance with evidence. 
 
4.2  Instrumental Values and the Better Decision 
 The main arguments made so far in this paper relate to the desire for a greater 
account to be given to instrumental values of democracy, namely the ability to arrive 
at µEHWWHU¶ decisions than alternative political structures. For these purposes, a µEHWWHU¶
decision is one where a problem or improvement has been accurately identified 
(which could be factual or moral, and relying on evidence and citizen feedback) and 
known contemporary evidence (or a consensus among experts and professions as to 
what is accepted as being) is relied upon to provide a solution that is most likely to 
yield the results aimed at. Imagine there was a scenario that was considered unjust. 
We can diagnose the injustice using moral reasoning, and then use evidence to 
identify and implement a corrective solution. Where questions are of a more factual 
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nature, like poor cancer detection rates, evidence can be both used to identify the 
problem and then correct it. Moral problems, by their nature, cannot be ascertained by 
evidence alone and so evidence can only confirm events and inform the debate, but 
classifying them as moral problem requires wider consideration, such as cultural and 
historical values. For instance, if a society is debating gay adoption it would be 
pertinent to include statistics on if children thrive or are harmed by being in such an 
arrangement as compared to others. Lay people can help to provide feedback and lay 
out base moral values upon which experts attempt to achieve and resolve. However 
those base values must be informed by what is physically possible and so evidence 
informs the base values and we can demand the base values are rational (or publically 
WHVWDEOHOLNHZLWK.DQW¶VWUDQVFHQGental formula). Also, political decision making is 
probabilistic and is based upon estimates of likely future outcomes. We cannot say 
with certainty that if we do A, then B will definitely occur, but only if we do A, then B 
is likely to occur. Assessing success is a retrospective activity in that analysis can be 
done to see if the decision produced the desired outcomes. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this definition of a better 
decision relates to the procedure that brought it about as opposed to a standard of 
correctness or political truth relating to the outcome. So long as we can be satisfied 
that evidence has been used and decisions have been taken upon the basis of relevant 
knowledge, we can accept its legitimacy and we can do no more as a society. 
Whatever the actual outcome, we must accept it as legitimate if it meets these 
procedural standarGV$V(VWOXQGSXWLW³$OOLWFODLPVLVWKDWWKHGHPRFUDWLFSURFHVV
KDVFHUWDLQHSLVWHPLFYDOXH«LWFDQKDYHWKDWPRGHVW value even when it is mistaken´ 
(Estlund, 2008, p. 106). To assess each outcome individually as to itVµFRUUHFWQHVV¶
would not only be difficult in practise, but would weaken the stability of the political 
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order. Certainty would be too weakened because a decision taken could be classified 
as being incorrect and citizen compliance with it could be challenged. 7KXVDµEHWWHU¶
decision relates to the quality of the procedure producing outcomes that, 
probabilistically speaking, will be based upon accurate understandings of reality, 
which in turn, gives a greater chance of achieving progress. The definition could be 
GHVFULEHGDVµVWURQJ¶SROLWLFDOFRJQLWLYLVPZKHUHDSURFHGXUHVKRXOGEHGHVLJQHGWR
bring about positive results (such as pareto optimality where at least one person 
benefits and no one is harmed), as opposed to simply the avoidance of harm as with 
µZHDN¶SROLWLFDOFRJQLWLYLVP(Landemore, 2013, pp. 212-213). 
 
4.3   The Service Democracy 
If it is accepted that instrumentality is the main aim and function of a state 
(including a democratic one), and it is further acknowledged that the observation of 
topic-specific ignorant majorities and knowledge minorities is accurate, we must then 
consider how best to structure decision-making within a polity. The service 
democracy is a theoretical account of how a society could be structured under these 
conditions and must be approached as such. Chapter 5 will deal with more realistic 
proposals that could be implemented into the present policy-making and constitutional 
arrangements. Indeed, just because a state and democracy have been arrived at in 
principle does not preclude a serious debate upon the nature of decision-making 
within democracy. The aim here is to outline a normative epistemic account of 
legitimate state authority and how we can make best use of existing knowledge bases 
and yet retain some recognisable form of democracy. It will not attempt to debate the 
specific scope of the State, but that where the State is judged to have power over an 
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area of life, it should be done with care and attention to knowledge. If we were to 
place this upon a scale, with direct democracy at one end and technocratic forms on 
the other, it would certainly be closer to technocracy than deliberative democracy 
would be (which would likely be in the middle of the scale), but it would not be quite 
of that character. It does not pursue instrumentality at the expense of all. It will fully 
recognise the plurality of knowledge bases and allows for each citizen to play a role in 
the decision making areas that they specialise in, and provide feedback roles in areas 
WKH\GRQ¶WTo do this, the government will be primarily characterised as a service 
provider or administrator (hence the name service democracy) and citizens will be 
considered as service users who have the ability to provide feedback. This is built 
XSRQWKHQRWLRQWKDWVHFXODUGHPRFUDWLFJRYHUQPHQWVGRQ¶WWHQGWRPDNHmany moral 
proclamations (Sandel, 2012, p. 15), but instead try to respect the plurality of views 
and values as they neutrally provide necessary services.  
 7KHTXHVWLRQRIPRVWLQWHUHVWWRPHKHUHLVµwho should have the power to 
GHFLGH"¶ Who is it that makes that final call, and indeed who are the people who are 
involved in the decision-making process and what influence do they have and should 
they have? Democracy endows a public with great power, not only to express their 
own private interests but to take collective decisions affecting everyone within that 
jurisdiction. However, despite inheriting this great power from various previous 
political systems, can it be said that it is exercised well, or indeed, as a collective, that 
know what we are doing to the highest standards of human ability? Indeed, it can be 
certainly said that endowment does not automatically bring with it an understanding of 
what to do and how to exercise that power. 
 To consider these questions, democratic life needs to be assessed and 
reconfigured. As argued by the developmental republicans, participatory democrats 
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and deliberative democrats, public life is enhanced though mass participation in the 
political process. These visions require ordinary people to become involved, engaged 
and informed. The main point of contention is the plausibility of the expectation that 
most people do have the time, energy or desire to do this. This is definitely 
exemplified by the requirements of deliberation because this process is highly 
educational and therefore demanding. If we consider the operation of deliberative 
polls for example, these took place over many hours and days. For these to be rolled 
out on a larger scale would possibly be met with greater ill feeling than jury service in 
the manner it would randomly disrupt lives. I would argue that, realistically, such 
mass participation will not come to fruition due to the demands of life itself and in 
many cases a lack of interest outright. Such a participatory views operates upon a 
delusion that good decision making can be achieved with less than satisfactory 
attention to the education required to bring it about. More realistically is the view that 
people pay their taxes and then expect, either rightly or wrongly, for a paid official to 
do the tasks of governance for them; to do the research and take decisions upon their 
behalf. This is almost the essence of representative democracy and the recognition that 
political business is best left to an elected minority who can, of a fashion, do research 
and debate the contents of laws and bills etc. As such, I think that a desire for greater 
participation outside of elections would simply not come to fruition, irrespective of 
the philosophical arguments and desires for it to happen.  
This then leads me on to argue that all citizens expect their taxes to be spent 
wisely on the provision on quality public services. TKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUROHKDVEHFRPH
akin to a service provider (which can include being a limited moral arbiter over 
various issues like social equality and justice). When we consider the departments of 
government, they typically cover service provisions like health, education, police, 
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criminal justice and prisons, defence, subsidising transport, investing in secure energy 
sources, organising agriculture, immigration, helping businesses, organising local 
government (which then provide local services), organise social security, etc. You 
then have various quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (or quangos) 
overlooking and monitoring various parts of the public and private sectors. It could be 
said that most areas of human organisation have either government provision or 
government supervision. With this, the government could easily be seen as a huge 
corporation, with the public and taxpayers as shareholders who get to vote 
periodically at the 5 year AGM. I would personally embrace this view of 
governmental work and function. As hinted at above, the state can make moral 
interventions to ensure equality and fairness, but this is more limited due to pluralism 
and it being very difficult to find consensus on moral issues in diverse societies. 
Indeed, Isiah Berlin criticises a strong account of positive freedom on this point. He 
accepts that maximising individual freedom is not the only aim of social action 
(Berlin, 1969, p. 147) and that we do educate children to allow them the chance to do 
what they would like in the future, but the creation of authoritative structures to 
implement positive self-mastery by classes or people that will typically override the 
non-commensurate views and values of many others in a pluralistic polity is not a 
human ideal (Berlin, 1969, p. 148).  
As with any company, shareholders, as owners, hold the ultimate power to 
select their board of directors who then run the company day to day. This sounds and 
feels like a democratic state, but the difference is that the focus is upon competence to 
do the tasks necessary to keep the company running and turning over a profit, a task 
the shareholders may not have realised on their own. However within a democracy, 
VXFKDIRFXVRQFRPSHWHQFHLVQ¶WDVSULPDU\LQWKe same way. The focus instead is 
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upon getting people elected, as representatives, who will then run the country as the 
electors want. The main point of reference is therefore what the people (which on any 
specific topic operate with be dominated by an ignorant majority) desire as opposed to 
the main point of reference being the technical best management possible. These two 
SRLQWVRIUHIHUHQFHGRQ¶WWKRXJKKDYHWREHVHSDUDWH,WFRXOGEHSRVVLEOHWRKDYHD
system where both representation and technical management could co-exist.  
For this, it is necessary to consider the role of the Member of Parliament as 
presently stands in British politics. It would be true to say that they have a dual role: 
WKDWRIUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHLUFRQVWLWXHQW¶VLQWHUHVWVDQGDQ\RWKHr party and private 
interests they wish) and being the solution providers for the problems represented to 
them. As presently constructed, representative democracy offers the public the power 
to decide over their polity at periodic elections. Despite possible lobbying of the 
elected, the power to decide shifts in between elections to those chosen to make 
decisions on behalf of the electorate. The service democracy would not alter this 
power shift. It would though take issue with the dual role of MPs and argue that those 
occupying the knowledgeable minorities of various topic areas should have a greater 
role in the provision of solutions to the problems identified by the electorate. As such, 
there is a clear line to be drawn between the power to decide and the representation of 
opinions / right of consultation.  
If the language of the pluralities of ignorant majorities is used, it could be 
argued that the knowledgeable minorities should have the power to decide, whilst the 
ignorant majorities should perform a user feedback function to the knowledgeable. 
Indeed, such feedback is vital in knowing if the actions taken are working as, after all, 
the whole aim of any policy-makers is to produce quality services that address human 
needs. Further to this, the right to be consulted is an integral part to the legitimation of 
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coercively taking taxation, as both the occupants of the knowledgeable minority and 
ignorant majority both have to pay for services. This is underpinned by a similar idea 
to that of deliberative democracy, where an opinion is not of itself valid by virtue of 
being an opinion. There is a further qualification to the ability to decide over other 
SHRSOH¶VOLYHVWKDWWKHRSLQLRQLVLQIRUPHGby contemporary evidence and uses 
rational moral arguments. It is surmised that the opinions of the knowledgeable do 
comply with this in their area of expertise, whereas the iJQRUDQWGRQRW7KHODWWHU¶V
opinions do matter for feedback purposes as these will be based upon actual 
experience of the services provided. The role of an MP, then, would be to almost be 
like a Union representative who focuses more upon the accurate representation of 
human wants as found in consultation and less so on the technical aspects of service 
deliverance. MPs and a Prime Minister may though play a more limited role in the 
latter as departmental mediators who help to facilitate discussion between different 
departments and help to bring together, say, the Ministry of Justice and the 
Department of Health in treating drug addicts in prisons etc. The Prime Minister may 
very well be considered the Chief Negotiator, who tries to synthesise the departments 
and bring people around the figurative table. It is quite possible that an MP will 
possess knowledge in some areas and such MPs would work well in mediation and 
contributing to the debates they have expertise in. The knowledgeable minority, by its 
very nature, only has competence in one area and so it may take generalists to suggest 
points of possible convergence.  
The policy process itself would have to alter to cater to the more research-
based environment. Gather new data and evidence does take time, as does the peer-
reviewed nature of its analysis. The question that has to be asked of modern policy 
FUHDWLRQLVµWhat is the rush?¶7KHDQVZHURIFRurse lies within the current electoral 
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cycles. Being statutorily five years, the onus is on very short-termist policies that 
typically cater to that five years. However, gathering evidence takes time and if we are 
to allow appropriate gathering and analysis, we need longer terms to operate within. 
Overall here, the important question that this tries to address is how a society, 
given the observation of topic-specific ignorant majorities,  can tap into the expertise 
of the rest of the population who have not chosen to go into a policy-making job, 
either a civil servant, lobbyist or elected official. In my view the service democratic 
conception does attempt to provide some justification of how those not in political 
roles, but possessing policy-relevant knowledge, should be brought into policy making 
and how those who do not possess such knowledge should not be in a position to take 
decisions affecting everyone. It is not enough to simply argue that better general 
education, as with deliberative democracy, would produce the best democracy 
possible. I would agree that if just one person was more informed and no one else was 
less informed, then democracy would be better than at present. However, this would 
not likely improve outcomes in any measurable way. The argument for better general 
education of voters does not particularly hold for these purposes. Voters are endowed 
with the authority to make judgments on all policy areas, despite having only 
professional / expert knowledge in a few. As such, any education would only provide 
a glossing over of many issues and so it would not produce super-human entities that 
are experts in all fields. Of course, if it did produce such entities then the observation 
of ignorant majorities would not exist. 
By attempting to tap into the vast knowledge that exists within the population 
(or cognitive diversity, something I would accept up to a point from Hélène 
Landemore¶VZRUN, decision-making can be improved and better comply with the 
account of µbetter decisions¶ given earlier in this chapter. The people still retain all 
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sovereignty, but the exercise of power will not be held by all of the people, all of the 
time. In the same way that representative democracy, with elected minorities who 
debate and take decisions, is still considered democracy, this further refinement can be 
also. There is still an element of voting and feedback, but this is balanced with 
objective evidence. It could be argued that on this view democracy almost becomes 
the establishment of a consensus within a given policy area, factoring in the evidence-
based expert views of professionals and academics, with the feedback mechanism of 
the ignorant majority. It is almost like a tailored wisdom of crowds, but for the 
knowledgeable minority. ,WFRXOGEHWHUPHGµZLVGRPRIWKHVSHFLDOLVHGFURZG¶ This 
then operates better because general wisdom of crowds accounts only work on more 
simple tasks and judgements. Once things become more specialised and technical, say 
by asking lay people to work out a complex mathematical problem, the crowd loses 
any ability to make good judgements due to not individually possessing the requisite 
VSHFLDOLVPDQGFROOHFWLYHWKLQNLQJGRHVQ¶WPDJLFXSVXFKDVSHFLDOLVP.  
It is important at this point to address any claims of utilitarianism and 
consequentialism generally. With regards to the former, there may appear to be 
similarity in that both aim for the ends of maximisation of human happiness, yet the 
means are different. Utilitarianism is populist in nature and classically does not pass 
too much judgement on the preferences that are ultimately aggregated in the felicific 
calculus. Whatever is then arrived at is considered the correct political decision (and 
indeed even morality itself). However, the service democracy does question 
preferences to a large degree and requires that they be in compliance with 
contemporary evidence. As such, the procedure that is used to arrive at decisions 
places an epistemic value upon the contributions. A knowledgeable minority has 
greater sway over a policy area than the ignorant majority would under utilitarianism. 
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Estlund would take this further and argue that epistemic procedures, and an 
introduction of instrumentalism into normative justifications of democracy 
(Landemore, 2013, p. 47), are not consequentialist either. In Democratic Authority, he 
posits that consequentialism is a slippery label due to some arguing that the normative 
content of any moral theory can be labelled consequentialist (Estlund, 2008, p. 164).  
His theory does not support the idea of Government doing anything to avoid primary 
bads, and so Governments must operate within an independent moral framework by 
which to judge actions (Estlund, 2008, p. 164) i.e. as per their compliance with 
reasonableness and evidence. I would add that with regards to the broader label of 
consequentialism, epistemic procedures do not quite fit into that category, but nor 
does it fit into a deontological category either.  Certainly the aim is to bring about 
good outcomes, yet the process, and so the means, is heavily scrutinised too. We are 
requiring evidence and rationality is used in the decision-making process, mindful of 




In trying to provide for an instrumental normative account of democracy, it has 
been necessary to try to give an outline of how such instrumentality could be justified 
and produce legitimate decisions. The first and third chapters have provided two 
arguments for democratic legitimacy being based upon the quality of decisions 
reachedRUWKHµEHWWHUGHFLVLRQ¶DVRXWOLQHGDERYH. The main argument has been the 
reverse-contractarian account of how it is rational that those emerging from forms of 
tyranny would analyse the utility of State apparatus along the lines of it being a 
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service provider and as such, any decision-making procedure used to control this State 
must comply with the ability to best provide those services. Democracy is the best 
such procedure because it allows for the full talents of human ability, through the 
observation of ignorant majorities, to part-take in such decision-making, and allow for 
a feedback mechanism on performance. The second argument is less ambitious and 
holds that even under more conventional thought on democratic theory, when citizens 
take decisions in the polity, this has impact on other people as well as themselves, 
meaning that the threshold of knowledge demanded has to be higher than in the 
consumer market-place. It almost becomes a civic duty to ensure a good level of 
knowledge, which is maximised by a knowledgeable minority having a greater impact 
on policy than at present. 
These then lay the theoretical foundatiRQRIWKHµVHUYLFHGHPRFUDF\¶DFFRXQW
of how policy-making should be viewed from an epistemic perspective to achieve 
outcomes that work. In doing so it has assessed the roles of MPs under the present 
system and how the dual role that they perform could be split to allow for a 
functioning service democracy. This then leads on to discussions of how the present 










Application to Real-World Politics 
 
µWhen we ask politicians to take responsibility for policy areas and for making 
and sanctioning decisions in areas that they may not have much prior 
experience in, we, at least in theory, create the potential for poor decision 
PDNLQJ¶ - Adrian Barton and Nick Johns (2013, p. 55) 
 
As with any theoretical account, true merit comes from its real world 
application. In other words, a plausible democratic theory must concern itself with 
both theoretical and practical applications; with philosophical and institutional 
questions (Held, 2006, p. 266). Whilst Plato gives a fascinating account of the 
philosopher-kings, and Rawls in A Theory of Justice gives a compelling account of 
political rational consensus, they do not appeal to the realities of human capability and 
organisation. The preceding chapter on the service democracy was my own brief 
theoretical response to the observation of topic-specific ignorant majorities and an 
epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. This final chapter will look at ways that 
we can at least pay homage to that observation in real-world politics as exists today 
and so try to get more professionals, academics and experts involved in policy 
creation, or at least less lay-people (ignorant majority members) in positions of power. 
With this, the aim is to inject greater objectivity and an appreciation of evidence to 
arrive at evidence-based policy and not simply evidence-aware policy that is accepted 
or rejected upon ideological grounds. This will involve adding weight to existing 
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ideas, such as state funding of political parties and having parliamentary committee 
oversight of ministerial appointments, as well toying with newer ones like using 
technology to crowdsource academic and professional circles to help create policy and 
legislation.  
 
5.1  The Public Policy Process 
To begin an exploration of how the observation of topic-specific ignorant 
majorities could impact policy debates, a theoretical and practical consideration of 
how policy is presently made in the United Kingdom would be helpful. Instead of a 
broad overview, this shall focus on the policy process within the Ministry of Justice as 
this is where my own specialisms lie and so this would conform to the thesis of policy 
creation being decided primarily by those within the knowledgeable minority of a 
given area. 'HVSLWHGHEDWHRQLWVGHILQLWLRQµSXEOLFSROLF\¶will be taken as being a 
label for a field of activity; an expression of intent; specific proposals; decisions of 
government and the formal authorisation of decisions; a programme or package of 
legislation, staffing and funding; intermediate and ultimate outputs; outcomes of what 
is actually achieved and finally a process, not a single decision (Hogwood & Gunn, 
1984, pp. 13-19). 
 
5.1.1  Theoretical Accounts of Policy Making 
Contrary to the natural desire for clarity, there is no single unifying theory of 
public policy making (Cairney, 2012, p. 2). This disunity can partly relate to the 
descriptive and normative differences that study of such processes can take. The 
former relates to the actual breakdown of the policy process and the key factors that 
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operate upon the actors within policy systems, whereas the latter focuses on more 
idealist accounts of what the process should be like.  
The key classical descriptive theory is called incrementalism and was espoused 
by Charles Lindblom in his work The Science of Muddling Through (1959). This 
offered a very conservative account of how policy was made by claiming that 
evidence showed that policy makers did not look too far for solutions because existing 
policy was the result of past negotiations between government and private interests 
(Cairney, 2012, p. 6). As such, radical change was inappropriate as it would go against 
the grain of what was previously developed and arrived at by relevant parties. When 
policymakers locate values to begin the policy process, they tend to be the result of a 
negotiation process and trade-offs, rather than outright being the policymaker¶s own 
personal values (Cairney, 2012, pp. 99-100). Yehezkel Dror in Muddling Through ± 
Science or Inertia? (1964, p. 154) argues that incrementalism only holds if: the 
existing policy is broadly satisfactory; the nature of the policy problems have not 
changed significantly; and there have been not advances in the means of solving a 
problem. In the case of either developing nations trying to shake of colonial pasts, or 
generally in advanced societies trying to pursue technology-based solutions and 
evidence-based policy (as this thesis argues for), incrementalism does not satisfy these 
criteria and so does not offer much in terms of a descriptive account or indeed a 
normative one. It wrongly tries to legitimise conservatism and discourage new 
thinking (Dror, 1964, p. 155). 
Another account of policy making that would better be described as both a 
descriptive and normative account for the modern process is policy cycles (Hogwood 
& Gunn, 1984, pp. 42-43). This is the idea of breaking the policy process up into 
stages, such as identifying policymaker aims, identify policies to achieve those aims, 
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select a policy measure, legitimise the selection through public / legislative support, 
identify necessary resources, implement and then evaluate the policy outcomes 
(Cairney, 2012, p. 6). The process therefore begins with aims, or ideas. Ideas can be 
norms which relate to what is considered to be normal behaviour, or they can 
represent an ideological position that forms part of a more complex, coherent policy 
structure of a Government (Cairney, 2012, p. 220). It is only through understanding 
the source and motivations behind the ideas that a true appreciation of the policy 
process can emerge. From the perspective of this thesis, ideas should evolve from an 
evidential foundation as well as from any moral ideals. Other important stages of this 
process would be legitimation and evaluation. The former generally centres upon how 
the legislative bodies respond to the policy as it will be here where the policy becomes 
law, however it can also relate to how interest groups respond to the policy. As such, 
it is my view that knowledgeable minority crowdsourcing should also take place to 
receive views from across the academic and professional fields involved. The 
evaluation stage relates to performing assessments of the policy and if it achieved the 
desired outcomes posited at the beginning of the process. This relates to the concept of 
WKHµJRRGGHFLVLRQ¶DVGLVFXVVHGLQFKDSWHU in that the definition of a good decision 
relates directly to its ability to perform the desired aims. There I defined it as being:  
µ«ZKHUHDSUREOHPRULPSURYHPHQWKDVEHHQDFFXUDWHO\LGHQWLILHGZKLFK
could be factual or moral, and relying on evidence and citizen feedback) and 
known contemporary evidence (or a consensus among experts and professions 
as to what is accepted as being) is relied upon to provide a solution that is most 
likely to yield the results aimed at¶ 
Indeed, such evaluation of itself will produce knowledge of what does or does not 
work, and in that sense can feed back into the policy process.  
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 The main normative theory against which others judge themselves is 
comprehensive rationality. This provides a theoretically ideal policy-making process 
where policymakers have conducted wide-ranging research (or are aided by 
organisations) into all options before formulating their aims and ideals (that would 
presumably begin the policy cycle) in a logical, reasoned and neutral manner (John, 
1998, p. 33). As such it assumes that the aims and ideals of the policymakers without 
having done this are unusable. It further assumes that policymakers are able to 
separate values from facts and that it is possible to consistently rank policy 
preferences based upon the result of research (Cairney, 2012, p. 96). An alternative to 
this is offered from bounded rationality which claims to be a more realistic model of 
policymaking. This factors in uncertain aims and limited information when analysing 
the policy process and therefore finds comprehensive rationality to be too unrealistic. 
Herbert Simon in Administrative Behaviour (1976, p. xxviii) explains that 
SROLF\PDNHUVVLPSO\VHHNDFRXUVHRIDFWLRQWKDWLVVDWLVIDFWRU\RUµJRRGHQRXJK¶, as 
well as not having the ability to consider all facts comprehensively. Indeed, 
incrementalism also critiques comprehensive rationality by arguing that it is 
descriptively inaccurate as an account of policy-making, and normatively unrealistic 
as an ideal (Cairney, 2012, p. 98). Instead, Lindblom finds bounded rationality to be 
more acceptable as people operating within bounded rationality should only 
incrementally alter policy so as to respect past policy consensus.  
In principle to conform completely to comprehensive rationality model would 
be difficult, but to suggest this difficulty offers a way of ignoring evidence or justifies 
allowing ideological values to override evidence is not convincing at all. The 
collection of evidence is time-consuming, but time pressure tends to, in a political 
sense, come from the limited Parliamentary time available to work on and pass 
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legislation, which is not aided by the short terms of office for a Government. As such, 
if it were possible for a political system to give that time for proper research and peer 
review of results, society would benefit. 
 
5.1.2  The Criminal Justice Policy Process 
 Criminal Justice policy is primarily of concern to the government and so the 
state (both national and local) is central to its creation and administration through 
enforcement institutions like the police and courts (Barton & Johns, 2013, p. 8). As 
such, it is a public good paid for through general taxation and is intended to be non-
excludable in its scope. At its heart, criminal justice policy is orchestrated around the 
µFULPHSUREOHP¶WKDWDOOVRFLHWLHVIDFHDnd there is a three pronged strategy for 
managing this: legal regulation of behaviour; use of fiscal policy to redistribute money 
and to tax problem items like alcohol and; the promotion of normative cultural change 
(Barton & Johns, 2013, p. 17).  
 In terms of the models of public policy considered above, the most accurate 
description, and one that will be used here, would be the policy cycle. To begin this 
cycle, a policy proposal will contain a principled stance on an issue (such as wanting 
to reduce the number of youths hanging around on streets), a stated set of aims (such 
as reducing their ability to congregate in large numbers) and finally a course of action 
(such as introducing dispersal order powers to the police) (Barton & Johns, 2013, p. 
25):KDWLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHKHUHWKHQLVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIµWKHSULQFLSOHGVWDQFH¶ in 
informing the aims and courses of action. Unfortunately for the purposes of this thesis, 
this is less informed by evidence and more so informed by the prevailing political 
ideology of the governing party. If we accept the definition of political ideology as 
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contained in the Penguin Dictionary of Sociology DVEHLQJµDWLJKWO\NQLWERG\RI
beliefs organised around DIHZFHQWUDOYDOXHV¶(Abercrombie, et al., 1984), the 
beginning of the policy process is value allocation according to ideology. An obvious 
concern with this is the manner in which different governments can have different 
ideologies and after an election there can be considerable policy shifts as priorities 
shift. However, if policy was more evidence-EDVHGVXFKVKLIWVZRXOGQ¶WRFFXUWRWKLV
extent as the evidence does not alter upon who wins an election. A further concern 
with ideology-based policy is the manner in which proposals are marketed as being 
µFRPPRQVHQVH¶(Morley & Chen, 1996, p. 7). By doing this, they make any 
opposition to their polices appear to be counter to common sense and so irrational. 
However underpinning the policy will be a discernible ideological value that can very 
much conceal hidden agendas. For instance, the present Conservative Justice 
Secretary Chris Grayling introduced restrictions on prisoners receiving books and 
reading material through the mail (BBC News UK, 2014)7KHµFRPPRQVHQVH¶
reason given was that this was part of a reform to the Incentives and Earned Privileges 
scheme where the earning of privileges was made harder and receiving outside items 
could undermine this tougher stance (NOMS Agency Board, 2015, p. 3). However, 
underpinning this is a deeper ideological view of criminality. Conservatives tend to 
view behaviour moralistically and place a focus upon personal responsibility (Lakoff, 
2002, p. 24). Within this context, criminality is seen as a lack of morals and discipline 
and so considerations of any socio-economic factors seem of less importance. 
Ideology therefore trumps evidence in this regard.  
 The above example leads into how ideological values are used to diagnose a 
problem. In other words, it can inform how policy is decided upon and how agendas 
are chosen. In this sense there is a social event, which is perceived as a social problem 
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and so a policy is needed to tackle it (Barton & Johns, 2013, p. 39). When values are 
informed by ideology, it can lead to a divergence of opinion on what is causing a 
problem. In terms of the book ban policy, those of a conservative ideology may decide 
that a tougher prison environment is needed to provide a deterrent and so reduce both 
reoffending and original offending, whereas a liberal (in the contemporary sense) may 
decide that a rehabilitative prison environment is needed to help offenders move away 
from criminality. We therefore have a social event (criminal offending) and we have 
policy responses. For conservatives, this is a book ban as part of a tough regime and 
for liberals it would be keeping and expanding book availability as part of 
rehabilitation and education. 
 Murray Edelman in his book The Politics of Misinformation (2001) takes a 
different, more sinister view. He argues that political elites deliberately misdiagnose 
problems in order to satisfy a more hidden ideological agenda. Therefore a 
conservative may very well know criminality is caused more by socio-economic 
factors, but to properly tackle this would require huge social programmes, which 
would expand the state and increase taxes. As a conservative, this would be counter to 
their free-market neo-liberal thinking and so it is better to misdirect the public into 
thinking crime is a failure of discipline and that tougher sentences and more police 
powers are needed.  
Similar to the above is the denial of problems and non-decision making. As 
politicians aim to get elected, tougher decisions or µtruths¶WKDWGRQRW conform to the 
ideological views of politicians or society can be ignored. In a time of 
multiculturalism (as accepted by both the Conservative and Labour), there were 
appalling failures by government agencies in response to grooming gangs in 
Rotherham (Buchanan, 2015). The independent inquiry by Alexis Jay (2014) that 
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looked into the abuse claims  argued that the local council, Police and social services 
feared that tackling this issue could either been seen as racism or could threaten public 
acceptance of multiculturalism as the perpetrators were predominately Pakistani 
Muslim males targeting white girls. The report states:  
³6HYHUDOFRXQFLOORUVLQWHUYLHZHGEHOLHYHGWKDWE\RSHQLQJXSWKHVHLVVXHVWKH\
could be 'giving oxygen' to racist perspectives that might in turn attract 
e[WUHPLVWSROLWLFDOJURXSVDQGWKUHDWHQFRPPXQLW\FRKHVLRQ´(Jay, 2014, p. 93) 
By taking such positions, sickening crimes were not investigated and stopped. This 
displays how ardently ideology can be followed, even to the extent of allowing 
criminal activity to foster and fester.  
4XLWHKRZDFFXUDWHWKHDERYHWKHRULHVRIµFRPPRQVHQVH¶ODEHOOLQJ
misinformation and non-decision may be unknown, but they do try to provide 
explanations for how policy decisions can conceal hidden ideological agendas. In each 
case, evidence is either not used or is manipulated to achieve typically private goals. If 
evidence was the primary driver of policy decisions and a knowledgeable minority 
could help to analyse and propose policy, then fears of hidden agendas would not be 
as pronounced. 
 The discussion of values and ideology is important in understanding the policy 
process in terms of the theoretical debates between comprehensive rationality and 
incrementalism. Of the two, the criminal justice policy process is more like the latter. 
Change comes very incrementally and it could be argued that the overarching criminal 
justice system comprising of organised police forces (formed in 1829), the courts to 
administer fair justice (the fusion of common law and equity being in 1973 with the 
Judicature Acts) and the penal system to carry out punishment and reform (the modern 
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conception coming from the Prisons Act 1878) has not particularly altered much. With 




PDQDJHPHQW¶LVDPRUHDSWGHVFULSWLRQ The policy of Police and Crime 
Commissioners is an excellent example of this. Its purpose was to make the police 
more democratic and accountable to the people living within the constabulary area 
(Home Affairs Committee, 2014, p. 3). In this sense, it was designed to give an 
LPSUHVVLRQRIµGRLQJWKLQJV¶because official explanations for the policy do not 
particularly focus on any perceived failings of the old tri-partite system of Home 
Office, Chief Constable and Police Authority other than needing publically 
recognisable figures. The Home Affairs Committee concluded that it was too early to 
properly tell if the policy was having any impact (in spite of them considering 18 
months of evidence), but felt they were offering greater clarity of leadership (Home 
Affairs Committee, 2014, pp. 19-20). With no proven effects on crime rates, this 
policy seems more of a symbolic reorganisation rather than an evidence-based 
proposal to genuinely improve the quality of leadership and subsequent safer 
communities. ,QGHHG/RUG6WHYHQVLQWKH,QGHSHQGHQW3ROLFH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VUHSRUW
Policing for a Better Britain (2013) GHVFULEHGLWDVEHLQJµULGGOHGZLWKIDLOXUHV¶ 
(Stevens, 2013, p. 13) aQGRXWOLQHGQHZSURSRVDOVWKDWZRXOGEHµVXSHULRUWR3&&V¶ 
(Stevens, 2013, p. 85). 
 This symbolism helps to cover for what is typically political and institutional 
constraints on the range of policy proposals that are realistically available to the 
decision-maker. A person has to work within the existing legal framework, 
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institutional designs, civil service practices, as well as considering the political reality 
of their proposals and if they will receive legislative support and ultimate public 
support. This is a valid point within a democracy where parties are aiming to be 
elected and therefore dare not go against the grain too much. Even within a world of 
evidence-based policy, the ultimate sovereignty comes down to the public (who 
formed the social contract and could leave it if they wished) and so some form of 
consent must exist. However, even within the existing institutional and legal 
frameworks, evidence can play a legitimate role and does not necessarily lead to 
completely radical outcomes. If there were more work opportunities within prisons 
(Neilson, 2012, p. 294), more drug treatment programmes (Andrews & Bonta, 2010, 
p. 286) and educational programmes (Education and Skills Committee, 2005, p. 14) 
then true evidence-based rehabilitation could occur without being too farfetched and 
unpalatable. Certainly once the crime reduction effects are felt and seen, the public 
would most likely come further on board. 
 Finally, it would be worth noting the groups and individuals who have 
influence and input into criminal justice policy in the United Kingdom. At the 
international level, supranational bodies such as the United Nations and the Council of 
Europe can influence domestic policy through the treaties they create and, in the case 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, subsequent ratification into law. 
Closer to home, the vast majority of policy is made by the United Kingdom 
Government. The head of this is the Prime Minister (PM) and they will have influence 
for two key reasons: crime is a key electoral concern and so it will be important to 
HQVXUHWKHSXEOLF¶VQHHGVDUHPHWDQGsecondly the Prime Minister is responsible for 
hiring and firing the Home Secretary and Justice Secretary3OHDVLQJWKHLUµERVV¶ZLOO
be an operating concern on the minds of key Secretaries of State (Barton & Johns, 
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2013, pp. 58-59). Below the PM is the Cabinet and whilst other Cabinet Ministers will 
not have direct influence, matters will be debated at Cabinet meetings and in the event 
of good arguments, policy could be changed. The most important of these other 
Cabinet members is the Chancellor of the Exchequer who sets the departmental 
budgets and could easily impact the number of police officers, prison guards etc. 
Below this are the Cabinet Committees where some Cabinet business is dealt with by 
smaller groups to relive the burden on the Cabinet. The main policy-makers, though, 
come from the departments themselves, with the Home Secretary and Justice 
Secretary at the helm in criminal justice policy. It is though debatable how much of 
policy is actually made by the specific individuals (in this case Teresa May and Chris 
*UD\OLQJDQGKRZPXFKLVPDGHE\VHQLRUFLYLOVHUYDQWDOVRNQRZQDVµPDQGDULQV¶
(Barton & Johns, 2013, p. 65). These are people with considerable expertise in their 
fields of work and can provide advice to the typically generalist politicians who 
occupy office. Naturally though, these people are not authorised directly to make 
policy and so do not face public scrutiny.  
A final important aspect of the policy process is the consultation and influence 
of experts. To have any hope of policy working, there must be some interaction with 
people who possess expert knowledge in their field and can give an assessment and 
advice. When it comes to criminologists, their influence is debatable. Garland and 
Sparks argue that their influence on decision-PDNLQJKDVEHHQµIDOWHULQJ¶(2000, p. 
191). More broadly speaking, evidence to the Justice Committee in their Crime 
Reduction Policies: A Co-ordinated Approach (First Report of Session 2014-2015) 
(2014), indicates that the academics they interviewed wanted research to be higher on 
the policy-making agenda (Justice Committee, 2014, p. 50). Professor Gloria Laycock 
though stated that research was one of a number of factors operating upon the mind of 
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an elected policy-maker, anGVRLWZDVXQGHUVWDQGDEOHWKDWUHVHDUFKZDVQ¶WWKHRQO\
consideration (Justice Committee, 2014, pp. 49-50). This though likely reflects the 
ideological dominance that pervades criminal justice policy and this is a key barrier to 
true rational empiricism in the field (Nutley & Davies , 2004, p. 105). Such concerns 
will be addressed in the following sub-chapter where I argue for greater roles of 
experts in the policy process through the use of technology, amongst other proposals. 
  
5.2   Epistemic Policy Proposals 
 As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the manner in which theoretical 
principles interact with the real world can help to validate them and allow us to derive 
practical utility from them. In this section I shall outline some ways in which the 
present political system could be realistically reformed to allow for more epistemic 
proceedings and reconciliation with the ignorant majorities principle. The reforms I 
consider are firstly the state funding of political parties, secondly committee oversight 
of Ministerial appointments, and finally the use of crowd-sourcing technology to 
allow whole professions to debate and construct policy 
 
5.2.1  State Funding of Political Parties 
 At present in the United Kingdom there is a small dependence upon public 
funding in the form of Policy Development Grants, Short Money for Opposition 
expenses in the House of Commons and Cranborne Money for Opposition in the 
House of Lords (Electoral Commission, 2015). Overall though, political parties get 
their funding from private donations which can take the form of either multiple small 
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individual donations, or a few larger ones (Fisher, 2011, p. 20). It is the latter of which 
can attract most attention and can be view suspiciously.  
 $VRXWOLQHGLQWKHLQWURGXFWLRQWRWKLVWKHVLV,DPLQWHUHVWHGLQWKHµOHJLWLPDF\
GHEDWH¶EHWZHHQIDLU-procedures and epistemic procedures. Traditional arguments in 
IDYRXURIUHGXFLQJRUHOLPLQDWLQJSULYDWHIXQGLQJUHODWHWRµIDLUSURFHGXUHV¶ and centre 
XSRQUHPRYLQJDQ\XQGXHLQIOXHQFHIURPµELJPRQH\¶DQGSULYDWHFRUSRUDWHLQWHUHVWV
(Fisher, 2011, p. 22). Where there is seen to be the involvement of powerful private 
interests in political parties, the public can view this very negatively and perceive a 
distortion of the democratic process through corruption (Nassmacher, 1993). Indeed, 
just the perception of corruption (absence of real corruption) can cause a support for 
state funding of parties to rise (Losche, 1993). In this sense, the legitimacy of the 
system can improve with the belief in a fair process where each citizen gets their say 
and is listened to with equal weight. 
 In principle I can agree with the above. There is a dominance of the corporate 
interest (as outlined in neo-pluralist thinking) and this can certainly overshadow other 
legitimate considerations in the democratic process. However for the purposes of this 
thesis the analysis relates to epistemic procedures and so it is argued that state funding 
can reduce the µcorruption of evidence¶ and ensuring it will be interpreted in an 
unbiased manner. On the µVHUYDQWVRISRZHU¶YLHZRIH[SHUWLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHSROLF\
process, expert views are on the sidelines in the main. However, in times of difficulty, 
experts can be used by political elites to justify their ideological positions (Brint, 
1990, p. 366). Edward Banfield (1961) GHVFULEHGWKHPDVµKLUHGJXQV¶DQGµZLQGRZ
GUHVVLQJ¶WRSURYLGHVXSSRUWIRUSROLFLHVPDGHRQLGHRORJLFDOJURXQGV$VVXFK
evidence and expert opinion is not used as genuine bases for policy, but as a political 




can assume that the policy positions of the political elites correspond with that 
corporate interest. As such, evidence is corrupted by money when it is used as a 
football to provide support for a private interest. 
The value of state funded parties, then, is that it removes the need for reliance 
on private donations, and so policy-makers do not need to consider the interests of 
those private donors.  Ergo, they do not need to selectively use evidence and expert 
opinion to achieve this private end. Simply put then, if you are a politician whose 
paUW\LVEDFNHGE\µELJPRQH\¶\RXZLOOEHPLQGIXORIPDNLQJSROLF\WKDWSOHDVHVWKH
donors in order to maintain electioneering funds. However if the donor is removed 
from the equation, then theoretically, there is less of an incentive to manipulate 
evidence to suit the needs of the donor and thus yourself. As such, evidence can be 
considered more objectively which is of prime epistemic importance.  
Another epistemic argument here is that by freeing up political parties from 
having to fundraise perpetually, more staff and party members can think about and 
research more objective ideas (Fisher, 2011, p. 23). The more time that is spent on 
properly thinking through ideas, researching evidence that is free from donors 
influence and finally debating among members, the better the policy proposals can be. 
This does not necessarily mean knowledgeable minorities play the main role in party 
policy creation, but at least it moves members away from other tasks and focuses them 






5.2.2  Committee Oversight of Ministerial Appointments 
 At present, it is the prerogative of the Prime Minister to appoint whomever 
they wish to be a Cabinet Secretary, Minister or Junior Minister. This of course makes 
sense from the perspective that they should form an executive made up of people they 
believe will support their vision for the country and are presumably loosely 
competent. However, it leads to an intuitively odd position where many Secretaries of 
State and Ministers do not possess any academic or professional experience in the 
areas they take decisions over. If the present Cabinet is looked at, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer George Osborne holds no economic qualifications nor has ever worked 
within economics, finance, banking etc. Interestingly former Economic Secretary to 
the Treasury Chloe Smith was appointed because David Cameron wrongly thought 
she had been an accountant (Watt, 2012). She had in fact simply been a management 
consultant at Deloitte LLP, a firm that performs auditing and tax services amongst 
other things. The Home Secretary Theresa May has never studied or worked 
professionally in areas relating to immigration control or policing. Foreign Secretary 
Phillip Hammond has never been a diplomat, nor has the Justice Secretary Chris 
Grayling ever studied Law or worked in a legal / criminal justice field. The Secretary 
of State for Defence Michael Fallon has never served in the military or in the defence 
industry more broadly. He is lLNHO\PRUHDSWO\WHUPHGDµFDUHHUSROLWLFLDQ¶DVKHKDV
never worked outside of politics from leaving university and during his political 
career, he has only interacted formally with defence matter when he was appointed to 
be Minister of State for Portsmouth in March 2013 (Fallon, 2015). Health Secretary 
Jeremy Hunt has never studied medicine, nor has he worked in the medical field as a 
manager or practitioner. Former corporate lawyer and now Education Secretary Nicky 
Morgan has never been a teacher nor worked in a school in any form, and the same 
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can be said for her predecessor Michael Gove. Finally, the Energy and Climate 
Change Secretary Edward Davey has no qualifications in science, meteorology or 
climatology (presumably due to him being a management consultant),  and nor has he 
ever worked in the energy sector. If there were an Executive Expertise Index, then this 
present Cabinet would score very low indeed. 
 To try and alter this lack of experience at the highest levels, a constitutional 
change is required. Whilst the British constitution is uncodified, the prerogatives of 
the Prime Minister are contained within The Cabinet Manuel (O'Donnell, 2011), a 
published guide for members of Cabinet, other Ministers and civil servants in the 
FDUU\LQJRXWRIJRYHUQPHQWEXVLQHVV2QHRIWKHVHSUHURJDWLYHVLVµUHFRPPHQGLQJWKH
appointment of ministers and determining the membership of Cabinet and Cabinet 
&RPPLWWHHV¶(O'Donnell, 2011, p. 21). It goes on further to state that  
µ,WLVIRUWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHUWRDGYLVHWKH6RYHUHLJQRQWKHH[HUFLVHRIWKH
Royal Prerogative powers in relation to government, such as the appointment, 
dismissal and acceptance of resignation of other miniVWHUV«¶ 
He is therefore responsible for the overall organisation of the Executive and the 
allocation of functions between Ministers in charge of departments. However, the 
exercise of this prerogative is unchecked by any other component of the State. The 
only possible roadblock could be the Sovereign who formally appoints the Ministers, 
yet for them to refuse an appointment could create a constitutional crisis.  
I believe that there should be some oversight and scrutiny of such 
recommendations to the Sovereign in the form of an ad hoc parliamentary committee. 
Like with the Senate in the United States of America (Craig, 2013, pp. 900-901), there 
should be another body beyond simply the Head of Government, who can ask 
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questions and make recommendations to the Prime Minister on who, epistemically 
speaking, is qualified for the role put forward.  It would require a PM to have to 
defend appointments objectively and on its merits whilst requiring the prospective 
appointees to explain why they can do it. This would certainly prevent errors of 
judgement as with Chloe Smith outlined above, it would bring media focus on the 
competence and expertise of appointees and it would subsequently make a Prime 
Minister think about who is best placed, as opposed to who is politically convenient. It 
would still be the Prime Minister's decision who they would like to see around the 
Cabinet table, but oversight of this and a sort of 'job interview' style committee 
meeting could offer something presently lacking and allow the public to see who is 
taking decisions on their behalf. If the prospective appointee was judged to be a poor 
match for their position, the committee can recommend to the PM that they rethink 
their decision.   
 
5.2.3  Academic and Professional Crowd-Sourcing 
 Unlike the previous two proposals, it is this one that adds a new dimension to 
the policy cycle and truly harnesses the untapped potential of the wider professional 
and academic communities of a topic area. As is the theme of this thesis, enhancing 
the participation and exercise of power of the knowledgeable minorities is an 
important step in producing an epistemic democratic government.  
Crowd-sourcing  can be defined as being an online, distributed problem-
solving and production model by which an undefined group of people ± the crowd ± is 
invited to participate in an online task and help complete it by submitting knowledge, 
information or talent (Landemore, 2014, p. 10). A famous example of its use would be 
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the rewriting of the Icelandic constitution, beginning in June 2010 (Landemore, 2014, 
p. 4). This was the first time in history that a constitutional draft was aided and guided 
by popular input. It saw the creation of a Constitutional Council to formally write the 
drafts, the use of the internet and social media to help shape the contents of drafts and 
referenda to approve them.  
The purpose of using this technology is to improve outcomes beyond that 
capable by a narrower band of people. In other words, it is to draw on distributed 
knowledge and expertise the crowd has beyond the confines and cramped optics of 
bureaucratic organisations (Moss & Coleman, 2014, p. 11). At present, the policy 
cycle is primarily open to Ministers, with civil servants advising and carrying out the 
implementation and evaluation. Interest groups may have a limited input through 
consultations and it has already been seen that academics feel that research is 
undervalued. As such, the policy cycle is very narrow in scope and policy is 
incremental in development. Crowd-sourcing, however, would allow an entire 
profession to play a part and have access to government proposals and make 
comments and suggestions. In the case of commons-based peer production, defined as 
EHLQJDµVRFLR-HFRQRPLFV\VWHPRISURGXFWLRQ¶ (Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006, p. 
394), a crowd can actually construct proposals themselves using internal proposal, 
amendment and voting tools. Successful examples of this are strong in the software 
development market where GNU/Linux operating systems and Wikipedia have been 
collectively designed and built without formal managerial hierarchies or markets 
(Benkler & Nissenbaum, 2006, p. 400). In all, I believe that this would truly be an 
epistemic policy revolution that would see evidence used as the foundation of policy 
proposals, and it would satisfy the objections that topic-specific ignorant majorities 
creates. Indeed, however, the final approval would have to be given by a Minister, 
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who should be one appointed on merit and knowledge if the above proposals are also 
implemented with this. 
 It may be noted that the initial definition of crowd-sourcing specifies an 
µXQGHILQHGJURXSRISHRSOH¶+RZHYHUthis proposal would very much limit popular 
participation down to topic-specific professionals and academics due to the technical 
knowledge needed to produce detailed policy proposals. As has been noted with wider 
crowd-VRXUFLQJDWWHPSWVWKHPRUHFRPSOH[WKHSUREOHPWKHOHVVWKHµFURZG¶FDQ
produce useful outcomes (Anderson, 2006, pp. 10-12)$VVXFKDµVSHFLDOLVHGFURZG¶
is more apt for the role I would like them to perform. 
 
Conclusion 
 It has been seen that the policy process is one based primarily upon values and 
ideology, be they LQIOXHQFHGE\GRQRUVWKHSXEOLFRURQH¶VRZQVHQVHRILQWHOOHFW
When the theoretical approach taken by this thesis is considered alongside this reality, 
the reality seems wholly unsuited to the instrumental tasks and demanded placed upon 
those policy-makers.  It is accepted that some areas like immigration can be primarily 
based upon value-judgements of what is appropriate culturally and economically. 
Evidence can inform the debate, but certainly not decide it outright. However within 
the criminal justice field, the task of reducing and managing crime is more commonly 
accepted by all and so evidence can be used prominently to get on with that job. As 
such, to nonetheless still have an ideologically-driven policy area is unfortunate from 
an epistemic perspective.  
 Presented here are three realistic measures to help make adjustment toward an 
epistemic policy future. When working alongside each other, we could have an 
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executive and departments that are expert-OHGZLWKFKHFNVDQGEDODQFHVRQWKH30¶V
appointments), primarily work with experts and professionals to develop policy 
(through an internet-based crowd-sourcing system) and are free from any undue 
influence from private money and donors who could operate upon the minds of 
decision makers, corrupting their decisions to invoke or ignore evidence at will (with 
state-funding of political parties). Whilst this package of measures does not fully 
realise the service democracy, it would help to create epistemic democratic procedures 

















 The concluding remarks that I shall give shall follRZDµWKUHHPRYH¶VWUXFWXUH
of review, evaluate implications and consider future research. In terms of the first, I 
shall review the democratic literature, my arguments as to why it has shortcomings 
and my findings in relation to applying the topic-specific ignorant majorities 
observation to democratic theory. In terms of the second, I shall evaluate the 
importance of these findings and consider what impact these findings could have upon 
democratic theory. This will also include consideration of the short-comings of the 
thesis. Finally, I will outline what scope there is for future research in this area, 
especially with regards to experimentation with academic-crowdsourcing. 
 
Review of the Argument 
 The thesis began by considering how democracy has development over time. 
This helped me to define democracy, consider what makes it valuable as a decision-
making procedure and set the context of my contributions. It was clear from this that 
the definition of democracy is linked to how one values it. For those like Rousseau 
who valued complete and absolute involvement of all citizens, democracy becomes a 
ZD\RIOLIHWKDWLVLQWULQVLFDOO\YDOXDEOH,WLVYHU\PXFKµSHRSOHSRZHU¶LQDFRPSOHWH
sense. However for deliberative democrats who begin to value instrumental outcomes, 
GHPRFUDF\FDQEHGHILQHGQRWVLPSO\DVVRPHWKLQJµZHGR¶EXWDVVRPHWKLQJWKDW
µGRHVVRPHWKLQJIRUXV¶ After this consideration, I was able to provide my first of two 
arguments as to why I thought instrumental values were most important based  on 




FRQWUDFWDULDQ¶YLHZWRH[SODLQKRZDVRFLDOFRQWUDFWFDQEHIRUZDUG-looking. In doing 
so, I was able to think about how the primary reasons for creating a state would be 
because of the outcomes and services that we would expect. Indeed these instrumental 
outcomes are contained in the writings of Hobbes and Locke.  
 After this, it was important to engage with a contemporary theory and certainly 
one that was more instrumental looking. Deliberative democracy provided me with 
WKDWDQGZDVVHHQWRKDYHVRPHPHULW\HWGLGQ¶WTXLWHJRIDUHQRXJKWith regards to 
the former, the earlier theoretical work of Habermas and Rawls did provide a 
compelling account of rational beings converging upon rational points of view. The 
general institutional and procedural arguments of the deliberative democrats to help to 
educate citizens to allow them to have more informed view does seem sensible. 
However, Rawls and Habermas fail to recognise the impact pluralism can have on 
decision-making by individuals, and the more recent deliberative democrats fail to 
give explanation of practical ways to achieving this mass education, or even if the 
social epistemological arguments work. In all, my view was that they were on the 
right track, but in trying to get the entire citizen-body to be better decision-makers, 
they made it too impracticable.  
 Once the context had been set, I provided my main theoretical thoughts on the 
nature of democracy and the decision-making capacities of each person. To do this I 
RXWOLQHGIDPRXVµJXDUGLDQVKLS¶WKHRULHVWKDWVSOLWWKHSRSXODWLRQXSLQWRµH[SHUWV¶DQG
HIIHFWLYHO\µUDEEOH¶These were the writings of Plato in The Republic, John Stuart 
Mill in Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform and the writings on competitive elitism. 
However these all underestimate the specific specialism each person has by virtue of 
their professions and/or education. It is not enough to simply say expert vs rabble as 
the capacity for knowledge exists within each citizen depending upon the topic at 
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hand. Here I introduced my observation of topic-specific ignorant majorities. This 
does acknowledge knowledge difference, but explains how ignorance and knowledge 
revolves depending upon the topic at hand. A person may have an expertise in 
defence, but will not have one in health or education. As such, they can be in the 
knowledgeable minority or the ignorant majority depending upon issues being 
debated. For those who are in the ignorant majority, they can still provide a feedback 
function. In all, a polity can still function, but in a more tailored way. I was then able 
to provide my second argument as to why instrumental values are important and 
legitimate. When citizens take decisions in the polity, this has impact on other people 
as well as themselves, meaning that the threshold of knowledge demanded has to be 
higher than in the consumer market-place. It almost becomes a civic duty to ensure a 
good level of knowledge, which is maximised by a knowledgeable minority having a 
greater impact on policy than at present. 
 With these arguments in place, it was then important to outline how 
democracy could look if it was taken to its theoretical limits. This required 
consideration of how best to implement epistemic analysis: was it best to assess each 
individual outcomes, or simply design a procedure that was most likely to produce 
good outcomes? I felt the latter was most feasible and FRQVLGHUHG'DYLG(VWOXQG¶V
work in Democratic Authority on epistemic procedures. This led me into considering a 
GHILQLWLRQRIµEHWWHUGHFLVLRQ¶ZKHUH,GHILQHGLWDVEHLQJ:  
µOne where a problem or improvement has been accurately identified (which 
could be factual or moral, and relying on evidence and citizen feedback) and 
known contemporary evidence (or a consensus among experts and professions 
as to what is accepted as being) is relied upon to provide a solution that is most 
likely to yield the results aLPHGDW¶ 
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Once this was established, the Service Democracy was introduced which was my own 
theoretical outline of how a society could look under an adherence to epistemic 
procedures and rectification of knowledge imbalances. This vision entails expert-led 
departments, a reduction in the traditional role of an MP and reclassifying the Prime 
Minister as a Chief Negotiator who helps to facilitate action between departments and 
experts.  It too located flaws within participatory democratic theories and how their 
insistence of constant popular involvement was not realistic in the busy modern world. 
 Finally, I looked at policy making within criminal justice from a theoretical 
and practical perspective and proposed three epistemic reforms that could result in a 
greater appreciation of instrumentality and expertise. These were: state-funding of 
political parties, committee oversight of ministerial appointments and finally academic 
and professional outsourcing as a means of analysing policy and proposing new ones. 
 
Implications 
 Firstly, I would like to outline theoretical implications of this thesis. 
Democratic theory has seen a prime focus on intrinsic values for most of its history. 
Where democracy has succeeded tyrannical regimes, it is understandable that people 
find great solace in the fairness and equality of participation that democracy gives. An 
implication of this thesis is to try to provide an alternative view of democracy and 
give strength to epistemic arguments that see a future in specialisation. As an 
alternative to the norm, these kinds of arguments need to be taken seriously and either 
accepted or disproved. As I say in Chapter Three, any conception of democracy must 
interact and account in some way for topic-specific ignorant majorities. It is true 
though that the main difficulty of evidence-based approaches is the tension created 
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between public will on the one hand, and evidence on the other. One would hope they 
are synthesised, but as polling evidence has shown, they are not. As such, this thesis 
sympathises with deliberative democracy in its attempts to synthesis them, but 
concludes that realistically they will not be to any meaningful degree due to the 
observation of topic-specific ignorant majorities and the realities of busy lives. 
Therefore my observation of knowledge imbalances can help to be a foundation for 
arguments of greater specialisation on the basis of knowledgeable minorities.  
 Secondly, there would be implications for policy creation in the real world. If 
the arguments given here were to be considered important, then an implication would 
be how they could manifest themselves in the policy process. As I discuss in Chapter 
Five, the present policy process in the criminal justice is highly ideological and value-
driven, with less concern for evidence and research. However, if we began to think 
more epistemologically and locate and engage knowledgeable minorities, then we can 
move away from the political grandstanding that takes place and move towards 
genuine efforts to reduce crime and administer fair justice. The proposals I outline 
could see more objective (as in not influence by donor interest) expert cabinet 
members who create policy with entire academic and professional communities using 
crowd-sourcing technologies.  
 In terms of short-comings of the thesis and methodology, it has not been easy 
to outline the contrast between values and evidence with respect to how policy is 
generated. Evidence can inform policy choices, but it cannot ultimately decide policy 
choice is many areas, like immigration. Members of knowledgeable minorities would 
still have to make a call based upon something beyond simply the evidence before 
them. As with criminal justice, there is a tension between a demand for justice on the 
one hand (which may manifest itself in tough sentencing) and a demand for 
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rehabilitation and compassion on the other. An expert can have studies which say 
SURJUDPPH;ZLOOUHGXFHUHRIIHQGLQJEXWLILWKHOSVWRSHUSHWXDWHDµMXVWLFHGHILFLW¶
GXHWREHLQJVHHQDVDµVRIW¶UHVSRQVHWRFULPLQDOLty, then there could be public 
disillusionment. As with pluralistic objections to rational consensus positions, you 
cannot reason away an emotive feeling. However, that is not to say that new forms of 
crime responses cannot be pioneered, like restorative justice, which sees lower 
reoffending rates coupled with victim satisfaction. 
 Another short-coming would be a lack of empirical basis for the real-world 
policy reforms. Whilst in theory it would make sense that each reform can contribute 
to the creation of an epistemic policy system, there has not yet been studies to assess 
such propositions. This though can lead me on to the final part of the conclusion.  
 
Looking to the Future 
 In terms of future research in this area, there could be further theoretical 
development of the topic-specific ignorant majorities observation, such as considering 
the practicalities of defining the knowledgeable minorities and who would fit into 
them. As with 0LOO¶VZRUNRQSOXUDOYRWLQJLWLVKDUGWRVSHFLILFDOO\GHILQHZKR
should or should not fall into such a classification, and there would be crossovers. 
Equally, discerning a specific threshold of knowledge is necessary. Therefore 
TXHVWLRQVVXFKDVµ+RZPDQ\\HDUVLQDSURIHVVLRQTXDOLILHV""¶RUµ:KDWOHYHO
of education would suffice? GCSE? A-OHYHO")RXQGDWLRQGHJUHH"¶1DWXUDOO\WKH
higher the better, but there would need to be a line drawn.  
Further research could be done in the form of quantitative studies on the 




creation of software, but as a specific policy-creation method could be an exciting 
development. This is an emerging technology and so any research on this would be 
considered very contemporary and original. Equally, research on other epistemic 
measures to build an epistemic policy-making procedures would be useful. This could 
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